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ABSTRACT 
The Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO) has 
developed a mobile device strategy that will require the DoD information technology (IT) 
system acquisition process to acquire a mobile device management (MDM) toolset to 
mitigate information assurance (IA) risks created through the use of mobile devices on 
the enterprise domain. In an effort to target affordability and control cost growth, IT 
professionals need to understand how IA concerns are addressed through MDM and how 
properly scoped solutions can be sourced to reduce project risks related to cost, schedule, 
and performance for projects that involve obtaining an MDM toolset through the DoD 
acquisition process.  
This research develops a mixed method study to understand the concerns of 
federal information technology professionals who are knowledgeable on MDM and the 
acquisition professionals who procure the MDM solutions. In this research, the authors 
provide DoD professionals with a framework to select optimal MDM solutions through 
the identification of baseline requirements in order to operate effectively in a resource 
constrained environment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO) 
has developed a mobile device strategy that will require the DoD information technology 
(IT) system acquisition process to acquire a mobile device management (MDM) toolset 
to mitigate information assurance (IA) risks created through the use of mobile devices on 
the enterprise domain. However, applications set constraints that impact system hardware 
and network requirements (Englander, 2009). In an effort to target affordability and 
control cost growth, IT professionals need to understand how IA concerns are addressed 
through MDM and how properly scoped solutions can be sourced to reduce project risks 
related to cost, schedule, and performance for projects that involve obtaining an MDM 
toolset through the DoD acquisition process. The problem is that acquisition 
professionals lack the necessary baseline capabilities and technical boundaries, which 
limits their ability to properly source MDM solutions that will effectively integrate into 
the DoD enterprise architecture. 
B. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this research is to develop a mixed method study to understand the 
concerns of federal information technology professionals who are knowledgeable on 
MDM and the acquisition professionals who procure the MDM solutions. This research is 
crucial in support of DoD efforts to secure the network while providing maximum 
productivity and flexibility to the end user. In this research, the authors provide DoD 
professionals with a framework to select optimal MDM solutions through the 
identification of baseline requirements in order to operate effectively in a resource 
constrained environment. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 How can the DoD evaluate multiple MDM systems to produce the optimal 
MDM solution for a given department or organization? 
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 What is an effective approach for the DoD to identify the most 
critical evaluation factors when choosing MDM solutions? 
 How can the DoD identify critical technology elements (CTE) for 
MDM? 
D. RESEARCH METHODS 
A series of questions are drawn from existing research, literature, and personal 
experience that aim to stratify evaluation criteria and identify CTEs for MDM solutions. 
The questions focus on DoD MDM implementation, acquisition strategy, and functional 
capabilities. The final product is a mixed method survey and interview template intended 
for federal IT and acquisitions professionals with a functional knowledge of MDM.   
The survey and interview questions are subdivided into logical categories that 
allow for the efficient capture of information including the following: the preclusion of 
unqualified respondents, demographics, the relative importance of capabilities, and any 
additional comments concerning MDM.   
Chapter IV discusses each area of the survey and interview questions in further 
detail to provide follow-on researchers with a comprehensive understanding of the 
intended research methodology.  
E. DATA, OBSERVATION, AND ANALYSIS METHODS 
Based on the survey and interview data, the researchers identified questions that 
would be the most relevant to DoD IT and acquisition professionals. Some data may not 
be credible and may require further analysis or exclusion. Suggestions are offered to 
follow-on researchers regarding the execution of the survey and the use of automated 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. DEFINITION OF A MOBILE DEVICE 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST; Scarfone & 
Souppaya, 2012) defines the baseline of features that make up a mobile device as 
follows:  
 A small form factor; 
 At least one wireless network interface for Internet access (data 
communications) that uses Wi-Fi, cellular networking, or other 
technologies that connect the mobile device to network infrastructures 
with Internet connectivity; 
 Local built-in (non-removable) data storage;  
 An operating system that is not a full-fledged desktop or laptop operating 
system; 
 Applications available through multiple methods (provided with the 
operating system, accessed through the web browser, acquired and 
installed from third parties); and 
 Built-in features for synchronizing local data with a remote location 
(desktop or laptop computer, organization servers, telecommunications 
provider servers, other third party servers, etc.).  
B. MOBILE DEVICE USAGE 
Mobile device usage is expanding at a rapid pace. A 2011 Cisco Systems’ forecast 
predicts that by 2015, there will be nearly 15 billion network-connected mobile devices, 
about two for every person on the planet (Burt, 2011). Mobile technology increases the 
speed at which people acquire and generate data (Boyles, Smith, & Madden, 2012). 
Technological advances in mobile device processing and storage provide users with 
capabilities comparable to traditional laptop and desktop computers. The increase of 
mobile device use and capabilities has also increased their capacity for exploitation, 
therefore escalating their overall security risk to the enterprise. 
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C. MOBILE DEVICE THREATS 
There are an ever-increasing number of attacks on mobile devices. Malicious 
software, referred to as malware, on mobile devices increased by 155 percent in 2011, 
while mobile device security vulnerabilities increased by 93 percent in 2011 
(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2012). Over a 10-month period, from July 
2011 to May 2012, mobile malware variants increased from 14,000 to 40,000 (GAO, 
2012).   
1. Sources of Mobile Threats 
These attacks come from several different sources, including botnet operators, 
cybercriminals, foreign governments, hackers, and terrorists (GAO, 2012; see Appendix 
A). Botnet operators, also known as “botherders” or “botmasters,” are owners of 
information systems that have been compromised with a malware code that provides 
access to the information system’s resources (Harris, 2010b). The bot herder employs 
numerous compromised information systems (bot is short for robot, including a zombie 
or drone) resources for various functions, such as the transmission of illicit data or attacks 
on other information systems (Stalling, Brown, Bauer, & Howard, 2008a). Typically, this 
is done in a fee-for-service arrangement in which the bot herder utilizes the bots in an 
attempt to mask the original source of the data or attack (Harris, 2010b). Figure 1 shows a 
model of an example botnet. 
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Figure 1.  Botnet Diagram (From Harris, 2010b, p. 1021) 
 
 
Kim Taiple (2012) describes cybercrime as a term used broadly to describe 
criminal activity in which computers or computer networks are a tool, a target, or a place 
of criminal activity. Financial gain is the motivating force behind cybercriminals. They 
use illicit attack vectors to obtain data from devices, which is used to commit computer 
hacking, fraud, and other Internet-related crimes. Industrial espionage, intellectual 
property, and large-scale monetary theft present viable threats from groups of 
cybercriminals, not only to corporations and similar institutions but also to government 
agencies (GAO, 2012). 
A foreign intelligence service (FIS) may utilize signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
against mobile devices in the data-gathering stage (Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence [ODNI], 2012). Additionally, foreign governments may support the 
development of material solutions and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that 
could deny or disrupt data (supply, voice, economic) vital to homeland security and 
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national defense (GAO, 2012). The computer systems of U.S. government agencies and 
U.S. companies are repeatedly subjected to hacking by about 140 different foreign 
intelligence organizations, as reported by U.S. counterintelligence (Wilson, 2008).  
Tamara Dean (2010) defines a hacker as a person who masters the inner workings 
of operating systems and utilizes these systems in an effort to better understand them. 
Walker (2012a) further differentiates the term hacker into four classes: black hat, white 
hat, gray hat, and suicide. Black hats do not apply for authorization or approval to access 
information systems, but unlawfully use expertise for individual achievement or 
malevolent intent. White hats apply for authorization or approval to access information 
systems and use their expertise for refining security or for other protective purposes. Gray 
hats group individuals who are interested in hacking TTPs and who believe that security 
flaws in systems should be revealed. Individuals in the final category, suicide hackers, 
believe that their actions prevail over any prospective penalty. Note that hacking TTPs, 
which once required a robust base of computer knowledge and skills, can now be utilized 
by novices, also known as script kiddies, in downloadable form, allowing for ease of use 
against mobile devices (GAO, 2012).   
Terrorists, in an effort to harm national security, stall the U.S. economy, or limit 
the public trust and confidence, may attempt to ruin, weaken, or take advantage of vital 
infrastructures such as mobile networks. Attacks vectors, such as phishing schemes or 
spyware/malware against mobile devices with sensitive information, could be targeted for 
exploitation (GAO, 2012). 
2. Common Mobile Device Attacks 
Mobile threat sources can conduct attacks on mobile devices through the 
exploitation of hardware, software, and users. Common mobile attacks include the 
following: browser exploits, data interception, keystroke logging, malware, unauthorized 
location tracking, network exploits, phishing, spamming, spoofing, theft or loss, and zero 
day attacks (GAO, 2012; see Appendix B). 
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Browser exploits are intended to take advantage of weaknesses in software used 
to interact with websites. The installation of malware or the performance of other adverse 
actions on a mobile device can be accomplished through deceptive web pages and 
associated hyperlinks (GAO, 2012). 
Data interception can take place when an attacker is spying on data exchanges 
originating from or being sent to a mobile device. Data interception can be achieved 
through various techniques. The man-in-the-middle attack (MitM) can occur when a 
mobile device joins to an unsecured Wi-Fi network, permitting an attacker to capture and 
possibly alter data packets between devices (GAO, 2012). The implementation of digital 
signatures and public key certificates can mitigate this susceptibility (Stalling et al., 
2008b, p. 645). The process of an attacker capturing and not discarding data meant for 
another recipient exchanged over an unencrypted network is referred to as Wi-Fi sniffing 
(GAO, 2012). 
Keystroke logging is a type of monitoring that archives keystrokes on mobile 
devices in order to appropriate sensitive information. Generally, keystroke loggers 
transmit the information they capture to a cybercriminal’s website or e-mail address 
(GAO, 2012). Loggers can monitor either software or hardware. Software keystroke 
loggers can be implemented through a Trojan horse (Harris 2010a). Typical 
software/anti-malware scanning tools cannot identify a hardware keystroke logger 
(Walker, 2012a). 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Interagency Report (IR) 
7298 Revision 2 (Kissel, 2012), titled NIST Glossary of Key Information Security Terms, 
defines malware as a program that is inserted into a system, usually covertly, with the 
intent of compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the victim’s data, 
applications, or operating system, or of otherwise annoying or disrupting the victim. 
Malware can be malicious code, malicious applets, or malicious logic. The NIST 
Glossary (Kissel, 2012) explains that malicious code can be software or firmware 
intended to perform an unauthorized process that will have an adverse impact on the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system. Examples of malicious 
code include viruses, worms, Trojan horses, or other code-based entities that infect a 
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host; this includes spyware and types of adware (Kissel, 2012). The NIST identifies 
malicious applets as small application programs that are automatically downloaded and 
executed, and that perform an unauthorized function on an information system (Kissel, 
2012). The NIST explains that hardware, firmware, or software that is intentionally 
included or inserted in a system for a harmful purpose is malicious logic (Kissel, 2012). 
Malware can instigate a broad collection of attacks to propagate itself onto other devices 
in an effort to employ a number of possible functions. These functions include 
 accessing location information and other sensitive information, 
 obtaining read/write access to the device’s browsing history, 
 initiating telephone calls, 
 activating the device’s microphone or camera in an effort to record 
information, and 
 downloading other malicious applications. (GAO, 2012) 
  
Location tracking permits the position of listed mobile devices to be identified 
and observed. Location data may be gained through valid software applications as well as 
through malware configured on the user’s mobile device. Legitimate tracking can be 
accomplished with proper authorization and consent. Unauthorized location tracking 
occurs covertly without the user’s knowledge or consent (GAO, 2012).  
Harris (2010a) defines phishing as a type of social engineering with the goal of 
obtaining personal information, credentials, credit card information, or financial data. 
Phishing can include e-mail or pop-up messages to deceive users into disclosing sensitive 
information. Attackers employ bait to lure or “phish” for sensitive data through different 
approaches (GAO, 2012). 
3. Key Security Controls for Mobile Devices 
Users must take precautions to combat mobile security attacks. No single solution 
for mobile device security will prevent all of the attacks, but some key controls can help 
to decrease the likelihood of an attack. Enabling user authentication on the mobile device, 
such as a lockout pin and password, is considered essential to its physical security. 
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Thirty-three percent of smartphone users have lost their device or had it stolen at some 
point (Boyles et al., 2012). With such a high general instance of lost or stolen mobile 
devices, the ability to remotely disable or wipe a mobile device is critical to safeguarding 
its content and the network(s) it accesses. Implementing a whitelisting policy for mobile 
devices, in which only qualified mobile applications can operate on the system, mitigates 
the spread of malware and minimizes device exploitation. Each precautionary measure 
taken adds another layer of security to the overall system. However, the incorrect 
combination of, or use of too many, precautionary measures can prove to be a hindrance 
to mobile device functionality from a user level.    
The process of sending unsolicited commercial e-mail advertising for products, 
services, and websites is referred to as spamming. With the proliferation of mobile 
devices, spam is being conveyed in text communications in addition to electronic mail. 
This can not only impact the user’s physical environment by requiring the user to 
manually delete messages from the devices, but also cause the user to be burdened with 
additional monetary charges for the unsolicited texted messages. Malicious software can 
also be delivered through spam or in phishing schemes (GAO, 2012; see Appendix C). 
Mobile devices’ small form factor and their intended usage environment make them 
inherently simpler to lose or rob than the standard laptop or tablet. Additionally, the 
efficient hardware design of mobile devices allows for access through multiple points in 
order to retrieve resident data (GAO, 2012). 
Additional security measures can help to implement and manage mobile devices 
on a network. When an organization implements a centralized security management 
system of the entire architecture, a holistic view can be achieved. A centralized security 
management system can validate if an organization’s mobile devices are compliant with 
mandated security policies. The centralized security management system should include 
configuration control and management permissions. These in particular can disable the 
ability to install malware to remote devices by individual users or a class of users that 
may have escalated privileges in an attempt to gain access to specific devices. An 
organization should include an enterprise firewall configured to isolate all unapproved 
traffic to and from wireless devices, and it should monitor incoming traffic with an 
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intrusion detection system (IDS; GAO, 2012; see Appendix D). Automated software 
tools can provide real-time status reports of a device’s compliance and status. Through  
active and passive scanning for key compromising events (e.g., an unexpected change in 
the file structure), information professionals can determine risk and formulate mitigation 
steps (GAO, 2012). 
4. Key Security Practices for Mobile Device Users 
System security is as strong as its weakest link. In a majority of systems, the user 
is the weakest link. By following some key security practices, users greatly reduce the 
overall threat level and vulnerabilities of a system. Public Wi-Fi is often riddled with 
security vulnerabilities. Thus, limiting contact with public Wi-Fi decreases exposure to 
possible exploitation (GAO, 2012; see Appendix E). Unknown web links represent a 
significant threat to mobile device security, and it is a best practice to never click on web 
links from suspicious e-mail, text messages, or advertisements (GAO, 2012).      
The installation of unnecessary software applications, or apps, on a mobile device 
also increases its potential security exploitation and vulnerability (GAO, 2012). Thirty-
eight percent of U.S. adults downloaded apps in 2011 (Boyles et al., 2012). Many of the 
apps on the market today gather information on the user and pass that information to 
other sources (Boyles et al., 2012). Fifty-four percent of app users have deleted an app 
from their device that they feel captured too much of their personal information (Boyles 
et al., 2012). The mobile industry also acknowledges that the data collection procedures 
of some apps are not defined well enough. Apple, Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Hewlett-
Packard, and Research in Motion have all agreed to provide better app privacy policies to 
their users (Boyles et al., 2012). 
Personal information shared over the Internet should be minimized. When it is 
necessary, appropriate measures will ensure maximum risk mitigation so that personal 
information is not compromised. Users should conduct Internet commerce through 
secure, encrypted connections (GAO, 2012). In addition, limiting the posting of mobile 
phone numbers on public websites reduces a user’s chance of an attack (GAO, 2012). 
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Mobile device settings play a large role in user security. Mobile devices with a 
discoverable mode should disable the capability, or set their device to non-discoverable 
(GAO, 2012). Devices in discoverable mode are visible to other devices in the immediate 
area and offer attackers an easy target for exploitation.  
Maintaining good physical control of a mobile device reduces its chance of being 
lost or stolen (GAO, 2012). Users should limit the storage of sensitive information and 
delete all personal information from a mobile device before discarding it (GAO, 2012).    
The popular practice of “jailbreaking” mobile devices, which bypasses integrated 
security and operating system restrictions, frequently results in expanded device 
capabilities. However, it often voids the warranty of the device and violates the terms of 
any contracts in place. In addition to legal ramifications, jailbreaking often results in 
higher security vulnerabilities in mobile devices and should be avoided (GAO, 2012, 
Scarfone & Souppaya, 2012).   
5. Additional Security Practices 
Organizations can implement some additional security practices that can help 
their mobile device users against threats and vulnerabilities. Establishing a mobile device 
security policy provides a uniform set of rules and practices for the entire organization to 
follow (GAO, 2012; see Appendix F). Specific security training for mobile devices raises 
the organization’s overall awareness of the subject (GAO, 2012). Being proactive in 
conducting accurate risk assessments on the state of mobile devices on the network can 
also help an organization identify, prepare for, and eliminate mobile device attacks 
(GAO, 2012). 
Taking the time to develop a well-thought-out mobile device deployment plan 
will help an organization meet its IT security objectives (GAO, 2012). Performing 
centralized mobile device configuration management and control allows for safeguarding 
against unauthorized modifications of devices within the organization’s network 
infrastructure (GAO, 2012).     
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D. MOBILE DEVICE SECURITY 
Scarfone and Souppaya (2012) list some additional mobile device features that are 
of particular security concern such as global positioning system (GPS) capability, digital 
cameras, microphones, support for removable media, and the ability to use the device 
itself as removable media. Scarfone and Souppaya (2012) recommend that organizations 
consider all smart devices as untrusted until they are properly secured and able to be 
monitored continuously while accessing enterprise data and services. An inherent risk is 
present when using a mobile device on any network that is not controlled by the user’s 
organization. This elevated level of risk can be mitigated through proper encryption and 
authentication measures (Scarfone & Souppaya, 2012). 
System security should be considered during the initial planning process as it is 
increasingly difficult to address after system implementation (Jansen & Scarfone, 2008). 
Security professionals are keenly aware that hackers are now tempted to conduct exploits 
on mobile devices similar to those they would conduct on a traditional computer (Viega 
& Michael, 2010). Security professionals are seeing mobile devices undergo attacks that 
were commonplace during the rise of the traditional computer (Rose, 2012). According to 
Jansen and Scarfone (2008), if mobile devices are not addressed in an organization’s 
security plan, the result will be a higher potential for security infrastructure compromise. 
The inherent ability of a mobile device to be mobile poses a risk of potential loss of 
sensitive data. Mobile devices can be located globally and have the ability to reach back 
to an organization’s infrastructure for connectivity, which poses challenges for 
administration (Jansen, Gavrilla, Séveillac, Heute, & Korolev, 2004). Once out of the 
normal work environment, users must be trusted to maintain positive control of their 
mobile devices at all times. The difficulty of mobile device security is compounded by 
the comparatively short life cycle of mobile devices and their higher cost of security 
assessment versus traditional network devices (Viega & Michael, 2010).     
Android smartphones are built upon the Linux operating system with applications 
functioning across components through middleware. This middleware is where hackers 
or those with malicious intent request greater permissions than actually required in order 
to access other applications to obtain the user’s private or corporate data. Liu, Moulic, 
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and Shea (2010) state that, “Managing such a complicated and diversified equipment 
inventory is an increasing[ly] demanding task for many businesses.”  
Individually managing every mobile device in an organization is an option. Aside 
from a greater amount of time and effort on the part of the information technicians, this 
approach also has security concerns. The security capabilities present on the average 
mobile device fall short of the capabilities offered from Mobile Device Management 
(MDM) software. Often the required password length is short and the standards used for 
encryption are lacking (Scarfone & Souppaya, 2012). In addition, the management of 
mobile systems not present in the enterprise is more difficult. It takes additional effort to 
ensure that these devices are properly updated, patched, and within configuration 
standards for the organization (Scarfone & Souppaya, 2012). 
Security policies must be enforced and monitored for effective enterprise-level 
security on mobile devices (Liu et al., 2010). Centralized security management 
streamlines the control, management, and adherence to policy of mobile devices within 
an organization (Jansen & Scarfone, 2008). Mobile device security and scalability are 
critical to an organization’s success when implementing an enterprise mobility solution 
(Liu et al., 2010).   
Automated tools decrease risk exposure due to misconfigurations encountered 
during IT provisioning and deprovisioning (Mont & Brown, 2011). Provisioning and 
deprovisioning are important in managing accounts and access rights on systems. 
Mistakes may result in system exploitation, including unauthorized access of information 
and resources, and the misuse of credentials for illegal purposes (Mont & Brown, 2011). 
E. MOBILE DEVICE MANAGEMENT 
During the 2010 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Seventh 
International Conference on E-Business Engineering, Liu et al. (2010) presented research 
demonstrating that businesses are increasingly over tasked to manage the growing 
equipment inventory. Additionally, Liu et al. (2010) identified that security policies not 
only require enforcement, but continual monitoring and updating of the devices’ 
associated applications to safeguard productivity. Mont and Brown’s (2011) research into 
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information assurance management (IAM) investments has shown how automation can 
reduce the failure points in how IT systems are configured, thereby reducing risk to the 
enterprise network.  
According to Schultz and Shpantzer (2010), constant Internet connectivity is a 
critical factor in business profitability. Commercial organizations have turned to mobile 
devices to provide that constant access. Security professionals are seeking mobile device 
management options capable of the same level of accountability, protection, and 
management as those available for conventional computer systems (Microsoft, 2006).    
Microsoft (2006) and Apple (2012) have integrated some mobile device 
management features into their network architecture designs and operating systems. 
Third-party vendors, however, have introduced solutions for MDM systems to provide 
broader device security and management capabilities (Microsoft, 2006). Key MDM 
features include provisioning, monitoring, management, security, and support (MaaS360, 
2012). The variety and number of controllable capabilities differ among products (Jansen 
& Scarfone, 2008).   
MDM platforms are built on a traditional client-server model achieved through an 
agent or app on the mobile device. As with traditional management systems, recurring 
broadcasts take place with managed mobile devices to monitor system configurations to 
identify unauthorized modification, update security credentials, obtain device log files, 
provide system updates, and perform other associated functions (Jansen & Scarfone, 
2008). Solutions can be mobile device platform specific or can operate across the 
spectrum (i.e., Apple’s iOS, Google’s Android, and Research in Motion’s BlackBerry). 
Monitoring mission-critical applications for updates and compatibility is crucial to ensure 
productivity (Liu et al., 2010).    
MDM solutions can be premise- or cloud-based with management conducted in-
house through the purchase of site licenses or as a contracted software-as-a-service 
(SaaS) package. Successful integration of hardware, software, and users depends on the 
strategic analysis of the business requirements and processes for a comprehensive 
security plan (Schultz & Shpantzer, 2010).  
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When determining the appropriate security plan for mobile devices, the NIST 
recommends an organization make the decision based on the sensitivity of the 
information and resources, the organization’s level of adherence to the security policy, 
the total costs associated with the decision, the physical locations of their mobile devices, 
any technical limitations on mobile devices or software being utilized, and the overall 
organizational compliance with other mandates and policies (Scarfone & Souppaya, 
2012). Organizations must remain vigilant and actively follow technological changes and 
trends in mobile devices, and modify any of their existing policies when necessary 
(Scarfone & Souppaya, 2012). Additional considerations when choosing a mobile device 
solution include the architecture of the solution on the network, the user authentication 
process, the encryption capabilities, the minimum security standards required, and 
determination and enforcement of requirements adherence (Scarfone & Souppaya, 2012). 
An increase in enterprise services used by organizations has spurred exploration 
into how to integrate them into mobile platforms in an effective manner (LaFranchise, 
2012). To succeed, integration should minimize the data received and stored on mobile 
devices, and applications should be fully functional without a network connection 
(LaFranchise, 2012). “The basic requirements for such a mobile solution should include 
the following: 1) timely, robust and easy access to Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) 
system, 2) transparency between connected, occasionally-connected, and disconnected 
modes, 3) loose-coupling system designed to combine services on demand, 4) lightweight 
application composition and development and, 5) low total cost of ownership.” 
(Natchetori, Kaufman, & Shapiro, 2008, p. 27) 
F. MOBILE DEVICE MANAGEMENT EXAMPLE 
No comprehensive, standardized criteria establish what MDM systems must do to 
be considered secure (Rhee, Jeon, & Won, 2012). The core tenants of security are 
integrity, availability, and confidentiality. Integrity is the detection of any intentional or 
unintentional changes to transmitted and stored data (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology [NIST], 2012). Availability is ensuring that users can access resources using 
mobile devices whenever needed (NIST, 2012). Confidentiality is ensuring that 
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transmitted and stored data cannot be read by unauthorized parties (NIST, 2012). The 
level of integrity, availability, and confidentiality determines the level of security of a 
mobile device.  
1. Mobile Device Management Architecture 
“[An] MDM system comprehensively manages mobile devices by monitoring 
their status and controlling their functions remotely using wireless communication 
technology such as Over-the-Air (OTA) or Wi-Fi, as well as managing the required 
business resources” (Rhee et al., 2012, p. 353–354). Rhee et al. (2012) outline an MDM 
system architecture in an enterprise environment and define a five-step system process 
(see Figure 2).     
 
 
Figure 2.  Mobile Device Management System (From Rhee et al., 2012) 
The five-step system process outlined by Rhee et al. (2012) is as follows: 
Step 1. Enrollment/Configuration: Register the mobile device and user data 
within the organizational MDM system and configure the device with the appropriate 
policies. 
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Step 2. Distribution: Install and distribute the MDM agent on the mobile device. 
The MDM agent can be distributed through the application store/market or in-house. 
Step 3. Authentication: When running the MDM agent, mobile device data (IMEI 
[international mobile station equipment identity], IP/MAC address, phone number, etc.) 
travel to the MDM server to verify whether it matches the data registered in the MDM 
system. 
Step 4. Instruction: The MDM server sends the MDM agent on the mobile device 
control policy and commands. 
Step 5. Control/Report: The MDM agent on the mobile device controls its 
functions according to the organization’s mobile device command and control policy. 
Control measure reports are sent to the MDM server. 
2. Mobile Device Management System Threats 
Threats exist in MDM systems as they do in any other IT management (ITM) 
system. Confidential information within the MDM system or the environment in which it 
operates, or any data transferred between its components, runs the risk of being leaked 
(Rhee et al., 2012). This is known as disclosure. Software vulnerabilities can open an 
MDM system to unauthorized modification (Rhee et al., 2012). Risk exists for attackers 
to bypass security measures to incapacitate or negatively alter an MDM system (Rhee et 
al., 2012). Attackers may also alter data saved, or transferred by, MDM systems (Rhee et 
al., 2012).   
MDM systems are vulnerable to malware attacks that strike in a variety of forms 
including viruses, worms, and Trojan horses (Rhee et al., 2012). Attackers can attempt to 
circumvent the proper authentication protocols by reusing system authentication data to 
impersonate legitimate users (Rhee et al., 2012). This practice is known as spoofing.  
A common practice of attackers is to flood a system or application with traffic to 
obstruct its normal operation. This is known as a denial-of-service (DoS) attack (Rhee et 
al., 2012). Another way to inhibit the normal operation of an MDM system is by 
exhausting the storage available within the system and operational environment with 
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unwanted data (Rhee et al., 2012). As a result, the MDM system is unable to capture 
security events and any data vital to the functionality of the system (Rhee et al., 2012). 
Not every threat originates from a human source. Natural disasters such as 
earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, and fires can disrupt MDM systems operations (Rhee et 
al., 2012). 
3. Mobile Device Management Security Objectives 
An organization can establish certain MDM security objectives to help mitigate 
the threats present within the mobile infrastructure. Protecting critical MDM system 
components through proper network security and a secure physical location is important 
(Rhee et al., 2012). The operating systems residing on MDM system components should 
receive regular updates to correct vulnerabilities and be free of any unneeded or untrusted 
services (Rhee et al., 2012).    
Organizations must choose MDM system administrators carefully. They should 
not harbor any malicious intent or ill will towards the organization and should be trained 
properly (Rhee et al., 2012). An MDM system should capture and track any security 
events and allow for updates to the system to fix vulnerabilities and shortcomings in 
performance (Rhee et al., 2012).   
An MDM system should protect saved data from unauthorized viewing, deletion, 
or change (Rhee et al., 2012). One way to safeguard data transferred over an MDM 
system is by using secure communications channels between system components (Rhee 
et al., 2012). An organization should offer secure enrollment of mobile devices and users 
to its MDM system (Rhee et al., 2012). Only authorized users on approved mobile 
devices should receive the MDM agent over a secure channel (Rhee et al., 2012).      
Once a user is enrolled in the MDM system and the user’s device contains the 
MDM agent, proper information assurance (IA) should be in place to properly 
authenticate and identify a device’s activity (Rhee et al., 2012). If a device fails 
authentication, a follow-up function should be in place through the MDM system (Rhee 
et al., 2012). Only authorized system administrators should change MDM system and  
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mobile device security settings (Rhee et al., 2012). MDM system administrators should 
receive user and mobile device status data to monitor for unauthorized activity (Rhee et 
al., 2012).   
MDM systems should be able to remotely update mobile devices with security 
updates and restrict access if devices or users are out of compliance with operating 
procedures (Rhee et al., 2012). User and functional data should be completely deleted 
from MDM system functional areas after a session is terminated (Rhee et al., 2012).   
Only pre-approved applications should be installed on mobile devices and MDM 
system components (Rhee et al., 2012). In addition, only authorized processes should be 
allowed for execution on mobile devices (Rhee et al., 2012). An MDM system should 
also contain some sort of malware identification and protection (Rhee et al., 2012). 
Unauthorized change or removal of the MDM agent should be detectable by the MDM 
system (Rhee et al., 2012). The ability to detect unauthorized changes to the MDM 
system or operational environment is also important (Rhee et al., 2012).  
G. MOBILE DEVICE MANAGEMENT IN A CLOUD ENVIRONMENT 
Manufacturers of mobile devices often provide little software support for their 
products (Ruebsamen & Reich, 2012). For security purposes, it is important to identify 
vulnerabilities in software and install updates as needed, especially in the operating 
system of a device (Ruebsamen & Reich, 2012). The emergence of cloud computing is 
allowing for centralized storage and synchronization across many devices (Ruebsamen & 
Reich, 2012). Ruebsamen and Reich (2012) suggest that cloud computing allows 
resource-intensive applications to run on mobile devices without the restriction of 
residing on the individual device. A proxy server located in the cloud can determine what 
devices are granted access to the available content (see Figure 3). 
  20 
 
Figure 3.  Mobile System Architecture With Cloud Proxy  
(From Ruebsamen & Reich, 2012) 
The security of the entire framework is based on the security and trust relationship 
between the user, the mobile device, the channel over which communications are taking 
place, and the proxy server (Ruebsamen & Reich, 2012).   
Ruebsamen and Reich (2012) suggest assigning a security level of 0–4 to 
individual mobile devices (see Figure 4). Level 0 means that a device is critically 
unsecure and Level 4 is assigned to devices that are highly secure (Ruebsamen & Reich, 
2012). The proxy server scans each mobile device to determine the level of security it 
resides at. The security level system determines the content that individual mobile 
devices can access through the proxy server.   
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Figure 4.  Security Levels (From Ruebsamen & Reich, 2012) 
H. BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE 
The increase of mobile device usage and capabilities is stimulating the 
“consumerization” of IT. Regard (2012, p.10) describes consumerization as “[t]he 
purchase of devices by employees who then petition IT to allow their integration into the 
corporate systems.”  Users become attached to their smart devices, and it is often hard to 
get them to switch to another type of device (Miller, Voas, & Hurlburt, 2012). 
Consumerization and organizational cost savings are main motivators behind the concept 
of bring your own device (BYOD). 
BYOD refers to employees using personal mobile devices in a business capacity 
(Avema Critical Wireless, 2011). Eighty-three percent of U.S. adults own a cell phone, 
and 42 percent of those cell phones are smartphones (Rose, 2012). Many commercial 
corporations have capitalized on this fact and stand at the forefront of integrating mobile 
devices into their organizations’ infrastructure. They realize that the reduction of 
hardware costs is a significant advantage (Schultz & Shpantzer, 2010). In 2012, 95 
percent of U.S. organizations permitted personally owned smart devices in the workplace 
(Miller et al., 2012).    
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Many organizational networks contain mobile devices that are self-administered 
by end users (Schultz & Shpantzer, 2010). This allows end users control over device 
settings in such areas as application and program installation, and configuration of the 
operating system (Schultz & Shpantzer, 2010). Most mobile device architectures 
complement a user’s ability to self-administer.   
I. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND MOBILE DEVICES 
The DoD CIO’s (2012, p. 1) mobility vision is “[a] highly mobile workforce 
equipped with secure access to information and computing power anywhere at any time 
for greater mission effectiveness.”   
MDM systems are utilized in an effort to mitigate the myriad mobile device risks 
facing organizations. The DoD CIO is proceeding with a mobile device strategy that 
includes the establishment of an MDM service in an effort to “advance the operational 
effectiveness” of the DoD enterprise network (DoD CIO, 2012). Goal 1 is to advance and 
evolve the DoD information enterprise infrastructure to support mobile devices. Goal 2 is 
to institute mobile device policies and standards. Goal 2’s second objective is to establish 
an MDM service. Goal 3 is to promote the development and use of DoD mobile and web-
enabled applications.  
The U.S. Communications-Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering 
Center (CERDEC) summarizes research conducted with the use of commercial phones in 
an Army brigade unit by highlighting that, while technically feasible, researchers are not 
including network management requirements into the overall network model (Kaul, 
Makaya, Das, Shur, & Samtani, 2011). This is in direct opposition to Objective 3 
(establish a mobile device security architecture) of Goal 1 of the DoD CIO’s Mobile 
Device Strategy.  
Most mobile devices are equipped with 802.11 capabilities that allow them to 
connect to ad-hoc networks. Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) contain mostly 
lightweight devices that possess minimal capabilities (Toubiana & Labiod, 2008). 
Security management is crucial to the efficient performance and resource use in 
MANETs (Toubiana & Labiod, 2008). In recent experiments, researchers have presented 
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“a deployment architecture and use cases for commercial smartphones to be used in a 
heterogeneous environment that includes expeditionary cellular, ad-hoc wireless and 
indigenous cellular networks as well as smartphones connecting to traditional military 
radios over other native interfaces” (Kaul et al., 2011, p. 2205). The results from these 
experiments highlight the fact that, while technically feasible, researchers are not 
including device management architecture in the network model.   
Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) is an Internet draft staffed with 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and developed as a joint venture by 
Microsoft, Cisco, and VeriSign. It is intended to simplify the distribution of certificates 
during large-scale deployments of mobile devices for network enrollment (Apple, 2012). 
In public key cryptography, the association between individual identities and their public 
keys must be authenticated in a secure manner (Liu, Madsen, & McDrew, 2002). This 
process prevents man-in-the-middle attacks in which data is manipulated by an unwanted 
party as it travels between the sender and intended recipient (Liu et al., 2002). Dense 
MANETs are prime targets for hackers and should be secured appropriately (Toubiana & 
Labiod, 2008). 
A possible solution for the security of mobile devices outside of a garrison 
environment, in deployed or emergency situations, exists through mobile security 
enclaves. These enclaves control access to network assets on an individual device level 
based on specific conditions (LaFrenier, 2011). A test application is run to determine if 
the device is connected to specific cellular or Wi-Fi base stations, or is located within a 
certain geographical location based on GPS coordinates (LaFrenier, 2011). If the 
application is passed, authentication between the mobile device and security enclave is 
conducted. This can be accomplished through the traditional exchange of keys. Once the 
authentication takes place, the mobile device has access to the specified content within 
the security enclave.   
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J. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITIONS 
The DoD’s total IT budget for fiscal year (FY) 2012 was $38.5 billion (Defense 
Budget Board, 2012). Its IT infrastructure has over 6,000 locations, 15,000 networks, 
3,000,000 users, and 7,000,000 IT devices (Defense Budget Board, 2012). 
When dealing with the acquisitions of IT systems, initial costs include staff, 
hardware, software, and enterprise purchases. Follow-on costs include support and 
maintenance, suboptimal staff utilization, and underutilization of client and support 
hardware (Defense Budget Board, 2012). An IT acquisition plan must take into account 
the entire mobile device life cycle. A mobile device life cycle consists of five phases: 
initiation, development, implementation, operations and maintenance, and disposal 
(Scarfone & Souppaya, 2012). 
It is critical to factor in enterprise architecture (EA) when making IT investments 
(GAO, 2004). The GAO (2004) outlines five maturity stages in IT investment. Each stage 
has critical processes that have to be met to progress to the next stage of maturity. Based 
on an organization’s individual circumstances, the framework can be applied in a unique 
manner to effectively guide the information technology investment management (ITIM) 
process. The guide also serves as an assessment tool for performance of ITIM and 
identification of areas of improvement. The GAO (2004) outlines some specific areas that 
the framework applies to, as follows (see Figure 5):      
 investment management, 
 strategic planning, 
 software/system development and acquisition management, 
 IT services acquisition management, 
 human capital management, 
 information security management, and  
 enterprise architecture management. 




Figure 5.  Critical Maturation Steps Required to Move to the Next Stage (From GAO, 2004) 
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The GAO (2011) examines seven successful IT acquisitions within the federal 
government and identifies common factors that contribute to program success (see Table 
1). The GAO (2011) identifies nine common factors as being critical to the success of the 
IT programs:  
1. Program officials were actively engaged with stakeholders; 
2. Program staff had the necessary knowledge and skills; 
3. Senior department and agency executives supported the programs; 
4. End users and stakeholders were involved in the development of 
requirements; 
5. End users participated in testing of system functionality prior to formal 
end user acceptance testing; 
6. Government and contractor staff were stable and consistent; 
7. Program staff prioritized requirements; 
8. Program officials maintained regular communication with the prime 
contractor; and 
9. Programs received sufficient funding. 
Of the nine common factors to successful IT acquisitions programs, having 
program officials actively engaged with stakeholders is a critical success factor in all 
seven of the programs analyzed. 
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Table 1.   Commonly Identified Critical Success Factors Across Seven Successful IT Investments  (From GAO, 2011)   
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K. LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
MDM is not a new concept, but it has yet to achieve widespread implementation. 
A limited amount of research and studies exist on the subject. The inclusion of mobile 
devices in an organization’s enterprise architecture (EA) framework have IT 
professionals seeking MDM solutions in order to mitigate security concerns and provide 
oversight on mobile infrastructure. With no clear MDM standards defined, the DoD faces 














  29 
III. EVALUATING MOBILE DEVICE MANAGEMENT 
SOLUTIONS 
A. ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE LINK TO OPERATING MODEL 
Operating models are important with respect to an organization’s enterprise 
architecture (EA) design to maximize business process efficiencies. Ross, Weill, and 
Robertson (2006a) identified the fundamental characteristics of the four types of 
operating models (see Figure 6). The GAO and Ross et al. both define the EA in similar 
terms, highlighting the need to merge business core functionality with information 
technology (IT) to maximize those efforts. Ross et al. (2006a, p. viii) explain that the EA 
“is the organizing logic for business process and IT infrastructure reflecting the 
integration and standardization requirements of the company’s operating model.”   
Merging business processes with technical innovation allows for the creation of 
current and future EA views (Shirazi, 2009). Nonspecific government-based models for 
an EA are available for reference. Bologa, Faur, and Ghisoiu (2010, p. 19) present a 
standard model composed of four fundamental components: “the architecture of the 
business models and processes, the software architecture that would support business 
processes, the architecture of the information and data that are used or obtained …, and 
the technology architecture suitable for achieving the objectives.” Schuck (2010) 
describes the EA as a “business system” that maps the overlapping line of influences by 
critical stakeholders that results in a practical resolution. Stakeholders achieve this with 
end-to-end communication of planning systems and data stores allowing for swift 
reaction to current information (Schuck, 2010).   
What is often overlooked is that different EAs operate within a complex 
organization (Ross et al., 2006a). Data requirements for each level are also different 
(Bologa et al., 2010). Data gathered at one level may not be needed at higher levels, 
whereas linkages between data points in different process streams are relevant. 
Alignment of business processes can be achieved through bottom-up analysis of data 
threads that confirm top-down business models’ data requirements are met (Bologa et al., 
2010).  
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Figure 6.  Four Operating Models (From Ross et al., 2006b) 
1. Chief Information Officer Role Linked to Architecture Maturity 
Model 
The term chief information officer (CIO) first came about in the private sector in 
the early 1980s with the expansion of information technology into the business workplace 
(Banker, Hu, Pavlou, & Luftman, 2011). The role of the CIO was to act as a bridge 
between the information technology section supporting the core processes of the business 
and corporate-level (C-Level) executives (Hunter, 2011). In the private sector, the chief 
executive officer (CEO), the chief operations officer (COO), the chief financial officer 
(CFO), and the CIO build the core management team of an organization (Dawson & 
Kauffman, 2010). The public sector does not use the titles CEO, CFO, or COO, but 
comparative positions correlate respectively (Dawson & Kauffman, 2010; Durmusoglu, 
2009). The title CIO did not exist within government until 1996 with the enactment of the 
Clinger–Cohen Act (1996). The private sector has seen the CIO’s role increase into C-
level leadership, growing from initial responsibilities of overseeing data processing, then 
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expanding to corporate-wide resourcing, and, finally, becoming today’s strategic-level 
business integrator (Hunter, 2011). Ross et al. (2006a) identified the four stages of 
architecture maturity as “a fairly predictable path to achieve a foundation for business 
execution and follow a consistent pattern for building out [an organization’s] enterprise 
architectures” (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7.  Enterprise Architecture Agility Over Time (From Ross et al., 2006c) 
2. Business Silo Stage 
Ross et al. (2006a) characterized companies at this stage as attempting to 
maximize individual business units’ needs or functional needs. The role of a CIO in the 
private sector is influenced by the reporting structure that the company creates (Banker et 
al., 2011). The two most common organizational models are for the CIO to report to the 
CEO or CFO (Banker et al., 2011). This is typical during the business silo stage of the 
architecture model (Ross et al., 2006a). The hierarchal structure that a company 
establishes has implications for the overall performance of the company through its effect 
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on the core management team’s interaction and decisions regarding IT long-term 
strategic initiatives (Banker et al., 2011). A CIO must be no more than two levels below 
the CEO in order to influence decisions (Banker et al., 2011). The Clinger–Cohen Act of 
1996 created the title of CIO. Individual organizations’ CIOs were quickly established. 
The first overarching federal CIO was not appointed until 2009 (The White House, Office 
of the Press Secretary, 2009). The federal CIO directs the policy and planning of federal 
IT investments, provides oversight on federal IT spending, establishes and oversees the 
federal EA, and ensures IT privacy and information security throughout the government 
(The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2009).   
During this initial stage, companies are designing business processes with CIOs 
focusing on IT functionality (Ross et al., 2006a). Business strategies are fixated on 
investments that will bring profits in the short term (Ross et al., 2006a). This is the 
traditional supply-side role of CIO leadership in which a CIO’s technical knowledge 
builds an IT foundation aligned to support the business processes (Chen, Preston, & Xia, 
2010). A private-sector CIO who continues to focus on only standard enforcement and 
integration of systems may not have the skill set to move the company to the next stage, 
or the company may outgrow the CIO (Chen et al., 2010). The CIO’s role in the public 
sector is more standards-focused than in private industry due to the government being a 
non–revenue-generating business (Fortino, 2008). 
3. Standard Technology Stage 
Ross et al. (2006a) characterized this stage as one in which companies provide IT 
efficiency through technology standardization and, in most cases, increased centralization 
of technology management. Shared infrastructure is the critical step in beginning this 
stage (Ross et al., 2006a). At this stage, organizations begin to share data, but business 
data require specific applications in order to utilize the information (Ross et al., 2006a). 
The federal government is in the early stages of this process, with the DoD lacking the 
details needed to execute the strategy (GAO, 2007). The CIO must effectively manage an 
IT budget to resource projects (Ross et al., 2006a). Within the DoD, the DoD (2010) 
Architecture Framework Version 2.02 (DoDAF) supports the CIO in development of the 
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maintenance of architectures as mandated by the Clinger–Cohen Act (1996). Corporate-
level risk management, change management, and problem solving are required in the 
CIO’s skillset toolbox (Hunter, 2011). Demand-side leadership traits become more 
critical for solving business needs and generating business opportunities with IT solutions 
(Chen et al., 2010).   
The CIO’s reporting requirements typically shift to the CEO as the organization’s 
priority shifts from risk management, which is a CFO purview, to alignment to business 
goals, which is a CEO purview (Ross et al., 2006a). Government agencies have shown 
greater division of power and increased requirements to conform to administrative 
processes when compared to private businesses (Dawson & Kauffman, 2010). Recruiting 
technology staff for the government has become more difficult due to a lack of interest in 
working for the government (Dawson & Kauffman, 2010). 
4. Optimized Core/Business Modularity Stage 
When a company views data and applications at an enterprise level, instead of a 
singular level, it is at an optimized core stage of development (Ross et al., 2006a). Ross et 
al. (2006a) identify that with a business modularity architecture, a company manages and 
reuses loosely coupled IT-enabled business process components to preserve global 
standards while enabling local differences. In essence, data and applications are captured 
at an enterprise level with the IT allowing for predictable core processes (Ross et al., 
2006a). During this culminating stage, an organization’s IT systems are able to produce 
services in the form of data that are in turn consumed by the business organization 
(Prohaska, 2011). Innovation and knowledge management have further expanded the CIO 
role (Hunter, 2011). CIOs are primarily organizational leaders that at the strategic level 
are leveraging technology not only to meet the business’ future needs but also to ensure it 
obtains and maintains a competitive advantage (Fortino, 2008). The CIO is required to 
have an organizational vision of how IT can allow growth and provide a competitive 
advantage (Chen et al., 2010). CIOs are not required to be the technical experts, but must 
effectively interact with C-Level executives so they can influence decisions related to 
aligning technology with the organization’s mission and vision (Fortino, 2008).   
  34 
At this stage, other C-Level executives rate the CIO’s effectiveness to lead the 
organization in exploring IT modernizations and strategic prospects (Chen et al., 2010). 
Quantifying success for the CIO at this stage, the private and public CIO are often at 
polar opposites. The private sector defines return on investment (ROI) as net profit 
divided by investment, while the government defines ROI as benefit divided by cost 
(Whitehead, Sarkani, & Mazzuchi, 2011). Success for the public CIO is contingent upon 
reducing cost while improving performance (Whitehead et al., 2011).   
5. Role of Enterprise Architecture 
An EA is not limited solely to the IT assets, but also comprises the business 
practices that make up the core of the organization in its current state as well as its future. 
Business strategies are often focused on investments that will bring profits in the short 
term (Ross et al., 2006a). Companies have realized that the steady rise in IT investments 
is a crucial strategic building block in the success or failure of their organizations that 
must be properly managed (Durmusoglu, 2009). Today’s web-like model requires high 
integration of business process data, while organizations must also seek consensus for 
designing an autonomous IT infrastructure within the business units for IT applications. 
This allows for business unit agility. Business units are able to seek a competitive 
advantage through an innovation within their business unit or restructure as needed in 
response to innovations within the ecosystem (Kelly, 2003). The federal CIO role 
continues to evolve in line with the architecture maturity model with greater 
responsibility and involvement as the federated architecture of the United States matures. 
DoD CIO skill sets will have to grow from those of the technical guru to those of the 
innovator who is able to motivate change at the strategic level. The DoD CIO’s roles and 
responsibilities will sequentially evolve, requiring de-confliction from other 
governmental agencies in order to remove duplication of efforts and align strategic 
initiatives with the government’s long-term goals. Government policy and official 
guidance will be required to effect the organizational change required to overcome the 
administrative processes in the federal system.  
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In conclusion, the DoD must align integration and standardization concepts as 
outlined by the operating models with the web-like value chain. To accomplish this, the 
DoD must transition to a coordination operating model in order to achieve an adequate 
level of process integration and standardization of data to leverage today’s network 
economy. The EA will denote the information systems executing the core missions of the 
DoD business units and mitigate risks. The end state will allow the DoD to be more agile 
with lower risk, yet provide increased capabilities through partnered successes. 
B. SYSTEM EVALUATION  
In Government Use of Mobile Technology: Barriers, Opportunities, and Gap 
Analysis (Digital Service Advisory Group & Federal Chief Information Officer’s 
Council, 2012), the Digital Service Advisory Group and the Federal Chief Information 
Officer’s Council identify four top mobile challenges (see Figure 8). The number one 
mobile challenge identified is Mobile Device Management.   
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Figure 8.  Top Federal Mobile Challenges (From Digital Service Advisory Group & 
Federal Chief Information Officer’s Council, 2012) 
The DoD Systems Management College (2001) defines a system as “an integrated 
composite of people, products, and processes that provide a capability to satisfy a stated 
need or objective.” To start the system evaluation process, one must first identify the 
stakeholders: those groups or individuals who hold influence over, or are influenced by, 
Mobile Device Management solutions.   
1. Identify Stakeholders 
To identify stakeholders, researchers must ask the question, “Who are those 
groups and individuals who can affect and are affected by the achievement of an 
organization’s purpose?” (Freeman, 2010, p. 54). The organization is the DoD, and its 
purpose is the implementation of an MDM solution. After identifying the stakeholders, 
their level of importance must be determined. To determine the importance of a 
stakeholder, an evaluation can be conducted using the power/interest grid (see Figure 9). 





Figure 9.  Power/Interest Grid  (After Ackermann & Eden, 2011) 
 
In addition to the identification of stakeholders, their management is also 
important. Each potential stakeholder is evaluated on the levels of power and interest they 
have in the project. Based on their levels of power and interest, they are grouped into one 
of four categories (Ackermann & Eden, 2011):  
 Crowd—have low power and interest in the project and warrant little time 
and effort on the part of the managers 
 Context Setters—hold the potential for significant power in the project, 
but have low interest in it; raising their awareness in the project could 
increase their interest in it 
 Subjects—are interested in the project, but have little power over it; 
providing encouragement and aligning other stakeholders with them can 
increase their power 
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 Players—hold both a high level of power and interest in the project and 
are considered significant stakeholders; quickly establish a good working 
relationship with them and maintain this relationship for the duration of 
the project  
2. Stakeholder Objectives 
After determining the importance of the stakeholders, the significant stakeholders 
are solicited for their objectives regarding MDM solutions. While several stakeholders 
exist for the implementation of MDM solutions within the DoD, there are only a few 
significant stakeholders at this point in time. MDM is a fairly new concept and does not 
have a baseline set of standards from which it can be evaluated. In addition, few 
stakeholders have the requisite knowledge of MDM to draw from to solicit quality 
objectives. The researchers have identified IT and acquisitions professionals within the 
DoD as two significant stakeholders in the DoD’s implementation of MDM solutions. 
Therefore, this research draws heavily from DoD IT and acquisitions professionals. 
3. System Requirements 
At this point in the research, individual system requirements are formulated. 
When formulating a list of good system requirements, there are some key attributes to 
keep in mind. A good requirement is achievable; verifiable; unambiguous; encompassing 
of the customer’s needs; able to answer the why and what, but not how; consistent with 
the other requirements; and not too detailed as to constrain available solutions (DoD 
Systems Management College, 2001) 
When combined, all of the system requirements should facilitate the fulfillment of 
the stakeholder objectives. The accurate capture and representation of the stakeholder 
objectives and system requirements are essential to the success of any information 
technology project.   
4. Cost Effectiveness Analysis Model 
To address the challenge of implementing a MDM solution, the researchers offer 
a four-tier cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) model to evaluate MDM solution 
alternatives (see Figure 10).    
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Figure 10.  MDM Cost Effectiveness Analysis Model 
When the requirements are compiled, they should be grouped into logical 
evaluation categories. The Federal CIO Council (2009) uses the evaluation categories of 
capabilities, cost, and security. For the DoD MDM, the researchers present the evaluation 
categories of capabilities, total cost of ownership (TCO), and security. Each stakeholder 
objective is aligned under an evaluation category. The researchers align initial cost and 
maintenance cost under total cost of ownership; policy enforcement, inventory 
management, software distribution, e-mail attributes, and administration and reporting 
management tools under capabilities; and security enforcement, malware control 
management, and virtual private network (VPN) management under security. Each 
individual system requirement will nest under its applicable stakeholder objective.   
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This outline forms the basis for the evaluation of potential mobile device 
management solutions using a CEA model. Weights are assigned to each evaluation 
category based on importance, with their sum equaling 1.0. Under each category, the 
applicable stakeholder objectives are also assigned a relative weight based on importance, 
with the sum of every category’s objectives equaling 1.0. This same process applies to 
each system requirement under all of the stakeholder objectives.  
When all of the weights have been assigned to each level of the model, the 
individual system requirements can start to be evaluated for the available alternatives. If 
the model is set up correctly, the system requirements should be the only items 
individually evaluated in the available alternatives. The requirements data collected on 
each alternative is input into the base level and feeds through the model, culminating in 
an output between 0 and 1.0. The closer to 1.0 an alternative scores, the better it fits the 
given situation. It is important to determine the relative weights assigned to each 
evaluation category, stakeholder objective, and system requirement before analyzing any 
alternatives.  
a. Deployment Environment 
Deployment environment is not addressed in the MDM CEA model. 
However, it is a critical factor in the evaluation of alternatives. Whether enterprise or 
tactical, the primary environment in which a MDM solution is deployed directly 
influences its requirements.  
C. MOBILE DEVICE MANAGEMENT EVALUATION REVIEW 
Enterprise architecture, stakeholders, objectives, and requirements are taken into 
account when evaluating MDM solutions. A CEA model allows the comparison of 
various alternatives. Each alternative receives a value, which allows for easier 
comparison and ranking.  
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IV. SURVEY DESIGN/IMPLEMENTATION 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTENDED AUDIENCE 
The acquisition and implementation of projects is an arduous process. 
Understanding project requirements from both a technical and fiscal perspective increases 
the chances for success. The researchers believe that you must determine the most critical 
factors when comparing alternatives in order to choose the best possible MDM solution 
for an organization. It is for this reason that the survey is designed to solicit information 
from federal IT and acquisitions professionals with knowledge and experience in MDM. 
This population should provide the most relevant and unbiased data possible while 
avoiding conflicts of interest or contractual challenges that arise by allowing contractors 
to participate. 
There are federal organizations that contain a concentration of individuals who 
meet the previously mentioned selection criteria. They include, but are not limited to the 
following: the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA); the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS); the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); 
U.S. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command (USA RDECOM); 
Communications-Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center 
(CERDEC); the MITRE Corporation (MITRE); and the National Security Agency 
(NSA). These organizations’ missions relate directly to the technical evaluation and 
planning of IT networks and hardware, and the application of networks and hardware.  
The DISA’s purview traverses full spectrum operations from joint warfighters 
with coalition partners to national-level leaders. The DISA delivers, controls, and 
certifies mission command systems and information sharing capabilities on a global 
scale. The DISA’s concept of the enterprise infrastructure is the backbone for users to 
join, communicate, and cooperate globally in an effort to more quickly incorporate 
technology and capability (Defense Information Systems Agency [DISA], 2013). 
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The NIST’s mission is to stimulate U.S. invention and industrial viability through 
the advancement of science, standards, and technology, addressing improvements to 
quality of life while boosting economic stability. The NIST’s information technology 
focus hastens the maturity and utilization of systems that are dependable, functional, 
interoperable, and secure. The goal of the NIST’s mobile security and forensics program 
is to advance the security of mobile devices and software (NIST, 2013). 
USA RDECOM seeks to safeguard the warfighter through the exploration and 
advancement of solutions proven to fill capability gaps identified through the acquisition 
process. Specifically, CERDEC improves and incorporates command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
technologies into the enterprise architecture (Communications-Electronics Research, 
Development, and Engineering Center [CERDEC], 2013). The Space & Terrestrial 
Communications Directorate is involved with MDM in reference to MANET research. 
MITRE is a not-for-profit organization with knowledge and expertise in areas 
such as systems engineering, information technology, operational concepts, and 
enterprise modernization. MITRE is funded by government sponsors in order to provide 
solutions for critical requirements. Serving as a federally funded research and 
development center (FFRDC), the National Security Engineering Center (NSEC) 
provides a wide range of technical and enterprise systems engineering support to the DoD 
and the intelligence community (IC) at large (The MITRE Corporation, 2012).  
The NSA, or the Central Security Service (CSS), roles and responsibilities are 
charter by Executive Order 12333 (National Security Agency [NSA] Central Security 
Service, 2013). The NSA’s mission is to provide an assessment indication for the United 
States and its allies through signals intelligence (SIGINT) and information assurance (IA) 
reports and packages that empower computer network operations (CNO). Specifically, 
the IA mission is to prevent foreign adversaries from obtaining access to sensitive or 
classified national security information (NSA Central Security Service, 2013). 
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B. SURVEY FOUNDATION 
The development of the data collection plan is approached through a mixed 
method methodology to be executed consecutively in five phases. Both open-ended and 
closed-ended questions are utilized. The data collection instrument is based on the 
validating quantitative data model variant of the traditional concurrent triangulation 
design type (Creswell & Clark, 2006). The qualitative questions on the electronic survey 
are supplementary to the quantitative questions. The qualitative questions are expected to 
provide insight and thought-provoking quotes that can be used to endorse and elaborate 
the quantitative survey findings (Creswell et al., 2006, p. 65).  
Open-ended questions are intended to provide respondents with an opportunity to 
reply in their own words (Glasgow, 2005). Open-ended questions provide  an opportunity 
to discover ideas that may not be addressed in the survey and to gather respondents’ 
perceptions regarding ways to overcome or address challenges. The researchers are also 
able to engage with respondents whom have great knowledge and experience in MDM 
and can provide course-of-action alternatives for the business environment.  
The closed-ended questions consist of three variations: closed-ended question 
with unordered choices, closed-ended questions with ordered choices, and partial closed-
ended question (Glasgow, 2005). The use numbers of closed-ended questions with 
unordered choices are minimal. They focus on the collection of demographic data. The 
survey instrument utilizes two closed-ended questions with ordered choices. The 
researchers opted to utilize partial closed-ended, Likert-style questions with a five-point 
scalar selection with an optional comment or remark section. A Likert-type scalar format 
is used to measure the respondents’ beliefs and attitudes in reference to the following 
topics: knowledge, functional requirements, and operating model. Specific Likert scales 
addressing the frequency and evaluation for specific questions are described in following 
sections. 
The five phases are as follows. Phase one consists of the execution of an 
electronic survey that collects quantitative and qualitative data. The researchers do not 
expect to capture an extensive qualitative data set through the execution of the electronic 
  44 
survey. Phase 1a consists of a convenience sample of key informant interviews utilizing 
the in-depth questionnaire of the data collection instrument. These questions are expected 
to produce an extensive qualitative data set. Phase two consists of the analysis of the data. 
The researchers utilized Microsoft Excel to conduct the analysis of quantitative data, 
which is discussed in the following chapter. Phase three consists of compiling the 
qualitative and quantitative data results in a logical manner. Phase four is corroborating 
the quantitative data with the qualitative results. Phase five is the holistic interpretation  




Figure 11.  Triangulation Design: Validating Quantitative Data Model  
(After Creswell & Clark, 2006, p. 63) 
C. SURVEY INSTRUMENT  
Within the federal government, several organizations have conducted commercial 
market research in reference to MDM releasing requests for information (RFIs) for 
sourcing solutions. The researchers draw heavily from a request for information (RFI) 
released by the Department of the Army, Army Contracting Command, Program 
Manager Network and Enterprise Services (PM NES), and the DoD Technology 
Readiness Assessment (TRA) Deskbook (Director, Research Directorate, Office of the 
Director, Defense Research and Engineering [DRD DDR&E], 2009) in formulating the 
survey instrument.  
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The instrument layout is logically separated into three distinct parts preceded by 
an introductory page. Part one focuses on the collection of respondents’ demographic 
data. Part two focuses on capturing information on MDM functional requirements. Part 
three is intended as an avenue for respondents to provide additional input on topics 
identified in Part two or expound into areas not addressed in Part two.  
The survey instrument was created using the online survey tool Survey Monkey 
(see Appendix I). The execution of an electronic survey will allow for the greatest 
number of respondents at the lowest cost. Additionally, an electronic survey allows for 
the filtering of respondents, which can be accomplished by a method that is commonly 
referred to as “piping,” or the act of directing specific questions to respondents though 
the application of question logic associated to the respondents’ answers during the 
execution of the electronic survey. 
1. Introduction Page 
The introduction page, commonly referred to as a welcome screen, is lengthy. For 
that reason, it is separate from the first question. The researchers incorporate the topics 
that Sue and Ritter (2012, p.60) suggest that a welcome screen should: “describe or 
reiterate the purpose of the survey, explain how the respondent was selected for 
participation, discuss the conditions of anonymity and confidentiality…” The researchers  
followed the advice of Sue and Ritter (2012) and designed the survey instrument to be 
motivational, easy to respond to, and contain instructions guiding respondents through 
the course of the survey.  
2. Demographics 
The demographics section, question one thru seven, of the survey consists of 
close-ended questions that request respondents to make a self-assessment. Respondents 
are asked a series of questions in order to capture general demographic information. This 
section is intended to serve two purposes. The first is to capture a baseline snapshot of 
knowledge, experience, and qualifications of the target population. This baseline can be 
used to address validity and reliability concerns surrounding respondents’ answers. The 
second purpose is to allow for cross-tabular analysis between demographic groups. 
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The previously mentioned organizations deal directly with the planning, 
implementation, and technical evaluation of IT networks and hardware. For this reason, 
the  amount of individuals with MDM knowledge and experience within these 
organizations should be adequate for a convenience sample. The following general duty 
titles are specified in the survey instrument: network administrator (NA), system 
administrator (SA), information assurance security manager (IASM), information 
assurance security officer (IASO), cryptologist (Crypto), chief information officer (CIO), 
chief technology officer (CTO), designated approval authority (DAA), and select 
personnel included in the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA; 
1990). See Appendix G for a detailed listing of career fields, related duties, position titles, 
and a crosswalk of civilian personnel codes to their uniformed service equivalences. 
Question one is presented as a multiple-choice, “select-one” format. Respondents 
are asked to “pick the best option that describes you.” The response options are: 
uniformed service, federal civilian, or DoD contractor. This question acts as piping 
question. If the respondent selects uniformed service, they are directed to questions two 
and three. If the respondent selects federal civilian, they are required to answer question 
four. Those respondents that select DoD contractor are not part of the target population 
(see the section titled Qualification/Disqualification).  
Question two is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format with selections 
arrayed in two vertical columns. Respondents are asked to select their Service 
component. The response options are: Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast 
Guard. Following in the style of the partial closed-ended questions, an “other (please 
specify)” block is provided for qualitative input. 
Question three is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format with selections 
arrayed in three vertical columns. Respondents are asked to “specify your pay grade.” 
The response options are: O1, O2, O3, O4, O5, O6, O7, O8, O9, O10, WO1, WO2, WO3, 
WO4, WO5, E1, E2, E3, E4, E5, E6, E7, E8, and E9. Following in the style of the partial 
closed-ended questions, an “other (please specify)” block is provided for qualitative 
input. 
  47 
Question four is presented in a multiple-choice select one format with selections 
arrayed in two vertical columns. Respondents are asked to select their pay grade. The 
response options are: GS1, GS2, GS3, GS4, GS5, GS6, GS7, GS8, GS9, GS10, GS11, 
GS12, GS13, GS14, GS15, SESI, SESII, SESIII, SESIV, and SESV. Following in the 
style of the partial closed-ended questions, an “other (please specify)” block is provided 
for qualitative input. 
Question five is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format with selections 
arrayed in three vertical columns. Respondents are asked to “select your 
Agency/Organization/Unit.” The response options are: DISA, DHS, NIST, CERDEC, 
MITRE, RDECOM, and NSA. Following in the style of the partial closed-ended 
questions, an “other (please specify)” block is provided for qualitative input. 
Question six is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format with selections 
arrayed in one horizontal row. Respondents are asked to “pick the best option that 
describes you.” The response options are: information technology professional (i.e., SA 
[system administrator], NA [network administrator], SME [subject matter expert]), 
acquisition professional (i.e., KO [contracting officer], PM [program manager], 2210 
[information technology management series], information assurance (i.e., IASM 
[information assurance security manager], IASO [information assurance security officer], 
Crypto), and information technology manager (i.e., CIO [chief information officer], CTO 
[chief technology officer], DAA [designated approval authority]). Following in the style 
of the partial closed-ended questions, an “other (please specify)” block is provided for 
qualitative input. 
Question seven is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format with 
selections arrayed in three vertical columns. Respondents are asked to select “your 
primary DAWIA certification.” The response options are: contracting, information 
technology, life cycle logistics, PQM [program quality management], program 
management, SPRDE-PSE [Systems Planning, Research, Development and Engineering- 
Program Systems Engineer], SPRDE S & TM [Systems Planning, Research, 
Development and Engineering - Science and Technology Management], SPRDE-SE 
[Systems Planning, Research, Development and Engineering- Systems Engineering], and 
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test and evaluation. Following in the style of the partial closed-ended questions, an “other 
(please specify)” block is provided for qualitative input. 
3. MDM Target Knowledge 
The target knowledge section of the survey instrument is primarily structured to 
confirm the target population’s understanding of MDM and, secondarily, to filter out 
respondents who should not be included in the research.  
Question eight is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format with selections 
arrayed in one horizontal row. Of note, this question is one of two closed-ended questions 
with ordered choices utilized in the survey. Respondents are asked if they “have 
sufficient product experience/knowledge in order to contribute to the expansion of DoD’s 
knowledge in regards to Mobile Device Management?”  Response options are yes or no. 
This is intended as a piping question to allow respondents to proceed to Part two – 
functional requirements. If no is selected, respondents are not considered part of the 
target population and are directed to the disqualification page (see the section titled 
Qualification/Disqualification). 
Question nine is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format with selections 
arrayed in one horizontal row. Respondents are asked “To what extent does your 
unit/agency/organization provide training to IT/AC/IS professionals on MDM?”  
Response options are: To a large extent, To a moderate extent, To some extent, To little 
extent, and Not at all. Following in the style of the partial closed-ended questions, a 
“comment/remarks” block is provided for qualitative input. 
Question 10 is presented in a multiple-choice, select-all-that-apply format with 
selections arrayed in two vertical columns. Respondents are asked, “What type of training 
do you require to become proficient in MDM?”  Response options are: iOS and Android 
operations systems, types of material solution, cost benefit analysis, information security, 
and bring your own device (BYOD). Following in the style of the partial closed-ended 
questions, an “other (please specify)” block is provided for qualitative input. 
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4. Qualification/Disqualification 
The target population is based on a convenience sample of the total population of 
which there are two disqualifiers. The first possibility for disqualification is determined 
by the role of the respondent, as addressed in question one. If the respondent selects DoD 
contractor, that respondent is piped to the disqualification notification for reasons 
previously outlined. The second reason for disqualification is based on the respondents’ 
perceived knowledge of MDM. Question eight requires the respondent to respond to a 
closed-ended question with a yes or no, acknowledging whether they possess sufficient 
product experience/knowledge to contribute to the expansion of the DoD’s knowledge in 
regards to MDM. If respondents answers no to this question, they are piped to a 
disqualification notification page. 
5. Part 2—Functional Requirements 
The functional requirements are addressed in questions 11 through 22. 
Respondents are asked to identify the importance of individual attributes of the functional 
requirements using a partial closed-ended question with Likert-type, five-point scalar 
selections and an optional comment or remark section. Each question utilizes the same 
five-point scalar selection of very important, somewhat important, neither important nor 
unimportant, somewhat unimportant, and very unimportant. The optional comment or 
remark section is there to provide the respondent an opportunity to respond to any of the 
questions or concepts presented in the survey (Glasgow, 2005). 
The researchers draw on functional requirements as defined by the Army RFI 
from Army Contracting Command (2011), identified as follows: 
 Software distribution is defined as the ability to manage and support 
mobile application use including deploy, install, update, delete, or block. 
 Policy management is defined as the development, control, and operations 
of DoD enterprise mobile access, connectivity, and security policy. 
 Inventory management is defined as the software, firmware, hardware, and 
peripheral device inventory management; this includes provisioning and 
support. 
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 Security management is defined as the implementation and enforcement of 
DoD-level device security, authentication, validation, and encryption 
functionality. 
Questions 11, 12, and 13 address the policy management function. Respondents 
are asked, “How important are the following attributes for policy management to 
MDM?”  The data is collected over a series of three questions for ease of the respondent. 
Data is presented in the confines of one screen, thereby eliminating the need to scroll up 
or down. The question is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format as a table with 
the defining attributes of policy management arrayed in the left-most vertical column. 
Attributes include the following: administer policies as groups, administer policies as 
individuals, complex password enforcement (strong alphanumeric password), enable 
browser enforcement through DoD proxy, enforce URL and web content filtering, 
support complex group policies (multilayered, hierarchical, etc.) and/or individual 
policies, support granular restrictive access to specific public app repositories and/or 
specific applications on specific public app repositories, alert system for users and IT 
administrators when device policies are violated, which includes the ability to “kill” 
devices when they become noncompliant, enforce DoD logon banner or custom text to 
device lock, force exclusive use of VPN for all Internet protocol (IP) traffic, policy 
compliance reporting, query for compliance and security information, restrict access to 
enterprise servers, administrator/remote reset of device password, CAC/PIV [common 
access card/personal identification verification] device authentication, device lock (after a 
given period of inactivity), disable automatic connection to Wi-Fi networks, disable 
infrared (IR) port, disable Wi-Fi radio, remote device lock, and remote device wipe (both 
selective and total).  
Questions 14 and 15 address the security management function. Respondents are 
asked, “How important are the following attributes for security management to MDM?” 
The data is collected over a series of two questions for ease of the respondent. Data is 
presented in the confines of one screen, thereby eliminating the need to scroll up or 
down. The question is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format as a table with 
the defining attributes of security management arrayed in the leftmost vertical column. 
Attributes include the following: bluetooth profile whitelist/blacklist by peripheral type, 
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bluetooth profile whitelist/blacklist by vendor, disable bluetooth radio, disable camera(s), 
disable cellular radio, disable microphone(s), disable removable media port, disable 
access to public app repositories (i.e., App Store, Android Market, etc.), disable location 
based services (GPS), disable screen capture, disable USB [Universal Serial Bus]/serial 
port (i.e., 30 pin dock connector, microUSB, miniUSB, etc.), disable use of preinstalled 
browser, disable voice dialing, and support restrictive management of USB/serial access 
by vendor and/or peripheral type.  
Question 16 addresses the inventory management function. Respondents are 
asked “How important are the following attributes of inventory management to MDM?” 
The question is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format as a table with the 
defining attributes of inventory management arrayed in the leftmost vertical column. 
Attributes include the following: device activation and deactivation; device configuration 
and imaging; enforce mobile communication expense policies, such as disabling cellular 
data or access to servers when roaming internationally; query support for device and 
network information; and trouble ticket and tracking management.  
Question 17 addresses the software distribution function. Respondents are asked, 
“How important are the following attributes of software distribution to MDM?” The 
question is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format as a table with the defining 
attributes of software distribution arrayed in the leftmost vertical column. Attributes 
include the following: access to private application repository, backup/restore of 
configuration data, backup/restore of software, push and/or pull over-the-air (OTA) 
software updates for applications and operating systems (OSs), and trusted controls for 
over-the-air (OTA) or tethered provisioning and updating process.  
Question 18 addresses the malware control management in reference to MDM. 
Respondents are asked, “How important are the following attributes of malware control 
management to MDM?” The question s presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format 
as a table with the defining attributes of malware control management arrayed in the 
leftmost vertical column. Attributes included antivirus and malware detection, phishing 
protection, and spam protection.  
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Question 19 addresses e-mail in reference to MDM. Respondents are asked, 
“How important are the following attributes of e-mail to MDM?” The question is 
presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format as a table with the defining attributes of 
e-mail arrayed in the leftmost vertical column. Attributes included CAC/PIV encryption 
and signing integration, DoD global address list (GAL) integration, integrated 
calendaring, plain text only native e-mail enforcement, and S/MIME 
[Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension] capability.  
Question 20 addresses VPN management in reference to MDM. Respondents are 
asked, “How important are the following attributes of VPN management to MDM?” The 
question is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format as a table with the defining 
attributes of VPN management arrayed in the leftmost vertical column. Attributes 
include: CAC/PIV encryption and signing integration, DoD global address list (GAL) 
integration, integrated calendaring, plain text only native e-mail enforcement, and 
S/MIME capability.  
Question 21 addresses administration and reporting tools in reference to MDM. 
Respondents are asked, “How important are the following attributes of administration and 
reporting tools to MDM?” The question is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one 
format as a table with the defining attributes of administration and reporting tools arrayed 
in the leftmost vertical column. Attributes include the following: a certificate of 
networthiness (CoN); access to management server via single or web based console role 
based access, business intelligence, analytics, and reporting tools; enterprise platform 
integration (i.e., LDAP, Blackberry enterprise server, sood mobile messaging, certificate 
authority, trouble ticketing and help desk, such as Remedy); FIPS 1402 level 1 
encryption of administrative (MDM) communications; group based action management; 
and integration of hard and/or soft token user authentication (i.e., common access card 
[CAC], microSD, near field communication (NFC), etc.).  
Question 22 addresses rating the functional requirements in reference to MDM. 
Respondents are asked, “How important to you are the following functions to MDM?” 
The question is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format as a table with the 
defining functions of MDM arrayed in the leftmost vertical column. The functions 
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include the following: administration and reporting tools, e-mail, inventory management, 
malware control management, policy management, security management, software 
distribution, and VPN management.  
6. Operating Model 
Ross et al. (2006a) define an operating model as follows: the necessary level of 
business process integration and standardization for delivering goods and services to 
customers. In the case of MDM, goods and services are defined in general terms as 
telecom and data applications. Customers are the end users of these goods and services. 
For this research, the customers are uniformed service members and federal civilians. 
Question 23 is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format with selections 
arrayed in a vertical column. Respondents are asked, “What best describes your 
organizations operating model?” Response options are: replication, diversification, 
coordination, and unification. Following in the style of the partial closed-ended questions, 
an “other (please specify)” block is provided for qualitative input. 
Question 24 is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format with selections 
arrayed in one horizontal row. Respondents are asked, “How dependent is your 
unit/agency/organization transactions dependent on the availability, accuracy, and 
timeliness of other units/agencies/organizations data?”  Response options are as follows: 
not very dependent, somewhat dependent, dependent, very dependent, and extremely 
dependent. Following in the style of the partial closed-ended questions, an “other (please 
specify)” block is provided for qualitative input. 
Question 25 is presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format with selections 
arrayed in one horizontal row. Respondents are asked, “How beneficial to your 
unit/agency/organization is it for your individual units/agencies/organizations to run their 
operations in the same way?”  Response options are as follows: not very beneficial, 
somewhat beneficial, beneficial, very beneficial, and extremely beneficial. Following in 
the style of the partial closed-ended questions, an “other (please specify)” block is 
provided for qualitative input. 
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7. Technology Readiness Level 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) established the 
practice of Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) in the 1980s in order to describe the 
development of individual technology components within various systems. The TRL 
concept does not certify design validity or indicate what resources are required to 
advance to higher TRLs. TRLs are an assessment based at a specific time. TRLs play an 
integral part in the critical technology element (CTE) concept discussed in the following 
section (DRD DDR&E, 2009). The levels scale from the beginning phases of controlled 
research (Level 1) to the effective utilization in an assembly (Level 9; see Appendix H).  
Question 26 utilizes a partial closed-ended question presented in a multiple-
choice, select-one format with selections arrayed in one vertical column. Respondents are 
provided an opportunity to review the definitions prior to responding to Question 26. 
Data is presented in the confines of one screen, using an abbreviated version of the TRL 
definitions, thereby eliminating the need to scroll up or down. Respondents are asked, 
“What TRL most accurately describes MDM systems?”  Response options are: 1) basic 
principles observed and reported, 2) technology concept and/or application formulate, 3) 
analytic and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept, 4) 
component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment, 5) component and/or 
breadboard validation in relevant environment, 6) system/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment, 7) system prototype demonstration in an 
operational environment, 8) actual system completed and qualified through test and 
demonstration, and 9) actual system proven through successful mission operations (DRD 
DDR&E, 2009). Following in the style of the partial closed-ended questions, an “other 
(please specify)” block is provided for qualitative input. 
8. Part 3—In-Depth Questions  
Part three referred to as the in-depth questionnaire,  the collection of qualitative 
data and consists of questions 27 through 55. This part is sub-divided into two sections: 
the operational experience questionnaire and CTEs. This transition contains a page break 
that highlights the shift in focus. Respondents are encouraged to provide as much or as 
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little information as they choose, allowing the opportunity to expound on concepts or 
issues not addressed previously. The presentation of the survey questions are presented 
differently than in the previous sections. These questions are presented simultaneously so 
that the respondents may select which questions to answer and in what order to respond.  
Question 27 is a piping question that uses a closed-ended question with unordered 
choices (yes or no type) presented in a multiple-choice, select-one format arrayed in one 
horizontal row. This question is one of two closed-ended questions with ordered choices 
utilized in the survey. Respondents are asked if they “Have experience in the deployment, 
integration, management and/or operational usage, of a MDM system?”  Response 
options are yes or no. This is intended as a piping question to allow respondents access to 
the operational experience portion of the in-depth questionnaire. If the respondents 
answer with yes, confirming that they have experience in the deployment, integration, 
management, and/or operational usage of a MDM system, they are directed to questions 
28 to 37. If the respondents answer with no, they are directed to questions 38 to 55, the 
CTE portion of the in-depth questionnaire. 
a. Operational Experience 
Questions 28 to 37 are open-ended questions crafted to gather 
respondents’ thoughts on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); systematic issues or 
concerns; operational capabilities; operational strengths/weakness; and/or any other 
operational considerations. The data collection effort attempts to gather input from 
respondents through questions crafted to link system capabilities to an operational 
capability which has impacted the unit/agency/organization (M. Kalainoff, personal 
communication, August 2010).  
 
Figure 12.  Linking System Capability to Operational Capability With Unit Impact  
(After M. Kalainoff, personal communication, August 2010) 
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b. Critical Technology Elements 
Questions 33 to 55 are open-ended questions modeled after the DoD 
Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Deskbook, intended to gather qualitative data in 
reference to CTEs (DRD DDR&E, 2009). CTEs can be hardware or software. The TRA 
Deskbook defines a CTE as follows: a technology element is “critical” if the system being 
acquired depends on this technology element to meet operational requirements (within 
acceptable cost and schedule limits), and if the technology element or its application is 
either new, or novel, or in an area that poses major technological risk during detailed 
design or demonstration. Specific questions in the areas of system design, commercial 
use, terminal hardware, processing hardware, networking hardware, and scalability are 
posed.  
D. SURVEY DESIGN/IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS 
SUMMARY 
The Defense Acquisition System is built upon phases punctuated by milestones or 
decision points (DAU, 2012). Porter et al. (2009) identified that defense acquisition 
executives (DAEs) are reluctant, for cultural reasons, to modify the acquisition program 
baseline (APB). In addition, Dillard and Ford (2009, p. 249) highlighted that “PMs 
should understand the nature of their product requirements with regard to their range of 
attainment and relative to key parameters of capability and vis-à-vis the readiness level of 
their enabling technologies.” 
Tomorrow’s acquisition programs will not be solely judged on fulfilling the 
requirements as outlined in the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System 
(JCIDS). Weapons systems and automated information systems will be assessed against 
capabilities that the current commercial marketplace can provide. The survey captures 
input from a broad range of SMEs in order to obtain the product requirement links to 
operational capabilities with supporting CTEs. In today’s uncertain environment, DAEs 
could utilize this survey and its subsequent data, as outlined in Chapter V, to dynamically 
align program investments while focusing on affordability.   
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V. EXAMPLE RESULTS, INTERPRETATION, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. SAMPLE DATA GENERATION 
The researchers chose to generate random results for the survey using Microsoft 
Excel. Only questions one through 26 of the survey are used in the artificially generated 
dataset (see Appendix J). Questions 27 through 55 are not addressed in this section 
because they contain short-answer questions that are qualitative in nature.  
The possible responses for questions one through 26 are each assigned a whole, 
sequential numerical value according to the number of responses in each question. 
Question two asks the respondents to select their Service. The possible selections include: 
Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard. Therefore, question two is coded as 
follows: Army (1), Air Force (2), Navy (3), Marines (4), and Coast Guard (5). 
The population sample size is 100 respondents. Every respondent has a unique ID 
of one to 100. The individual respondents follow the logical flow of questions in the 
survey based on their responses. A majority of the questions are answered by all 
respondents, but three are dependent on responses to previous questions. Consequently, 
the number of responses to questions three, four, and seven are less than 100. The 
dependency questions, and their associated questions and answers, are as follows:   
 3. Please specify your pay grade. Which depends on question one; Pick the 
best option that describes you. (Response: uniformed service) 
 4. Please specify your pay grade. Which depends on question one; Pick the 
best option that describes you. (Response: federal civilian)      
 7. What is your primary DAWIA certification? Which depends on 
question six; Please pick the best option that describes you. (Response: 
acquisition professional)    
 
Two exclusionary responses exist within the survey that disqualify the respondent 
from proceeding with the survey. The researchers have excluded these responses from the 
example. The questions that could cause respondents to be disqualified from the survey, 
and the answers that would disqualify them, are as follows: 
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 Question one. Pick the best option that describes you. (Response: DoD 
contractor)  
 Question eight. Do you believe that you have sufficient product 
experience/knowledge in order to contribute to the expansion of DoD’s 
knowledge in regards to Mobile Device Management?  (Response: no) 
 
For each question, the researchers performed functions in Microsoft Excel that 
randomly chose a number within the range of possible responses. For most of the 
questions, the =RANDBETWEEN( [lower], [upper] ) function was used to generate a 
random whole number between a lower and upper bound. For question two, this function 
looked like this: =RANDBETWEEN(1,5). The response to this function was a randomly 
generated whole number between one and five.  
As noted previously, question two is dependent on a response from question one. 
To perform this calculation, the researchers used the function =IF( [logic_test], 
[value_if_true], [value_if_false]). This assigned a specified value to the function if 
certain designated criteria were met. For question two, this looked like this:  =IF( 
[Question one’s Cell] = 1,1,0). With a response of uniformed service (1) to question one, 
the IF function in question two resulted in a value of one; any other response resulted in a 
value of zero.  
Putting an IF and RANDBETWEEN statement together in the same function 
allowed for the effective generation of a random response to questions that were 
dependent on another question’s response. For question two, this looked like this: =IF( 
[Question one’s Cell] = 1,1,0)*RANDBETWEEN(1,5). This function multiplied the 
randomly generated number by one if uniform service(1) was chosen as a response to 
question one, resulting in a randomly generated number between one and five for 
question two. If uniform service was not chosen as a response to question one, the 
randomly generated number was multiplied by zero, resulting in a null amount for 
question two. 
Appendix C contains the aggregate response rates for each survey question. 
Copies of the detailed data records are maintained with the primary investigator. 
Individuals may contact the primary investigator for request procedures.  
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B. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
The following sections walk through the results of the random response data to 
the survey questions, utilizing cross tabulation and graphical display techniques found in 
Microsoft Excel. The results are to demonstrate the possibilities for interpretation of the 
data generated from the survey questions. The results do not encompass all of the 
possibilities for interpretation of the data. They are examples of the scope and level of 
detail that the data can provide.  
1. Demographic and Target Knowledge Results 
Part one of the survey, questions one through 10, covers demographics and target 
knowledge. The responses to part one capture a great deal of information and provide a 
snapshot of who participated in the survey. The survey is intended for federal IT and 
acquisition professionals with a functional knowledge of MDM. The goal is to have a 
widely distributed demographic population that encompasses several organizations within 
the DoD and federal government. The response rate to question one shows a nearly even 
split between uniformed service members (51) and federal civilians (49) (see Figure 13). 
With this response rate, the aggregate results of the survey contain a nearly equal 
distribution of weight from the two groups. When the respondent numbers of one group 
within a population significantly outnumbers another group, it must be factored in when 
interpreting the data. Results containing a disproportionate number of respondents from a 
certain group will likely have results that are skewed towards that group’s perspective.  
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Figure 13.  Unformed Service Versus Federal Civilian Response Rate  
Within the uniformed service respondents, there is less of an even distribution 
across the service components. The Marines are the largest response group and represent 
27.5 percent of the respondents, followed by the Navy (21.6 percent), Air Force (19.5 
percent), Army (15.7 percent), and Coast Guard (15.7 percent). (see Figure 14). Given 
this data, an assumption can be made that the uniformed service data on the survey is 
slightly skewed towards the Marine’s perspective.      
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Figure 14.  Uniformed Service’s Response Rate 
The researchers also examined the individual responses of the organizations 
within the federal civilian demographic and found similar distribution to that of the 
uniformed service. The largest percentage of respondents is the “other” group at 22.4 
percent. This group comes from organizations not individually listed on the survey. With 
such a high percentage in the other group, it might be worth attempting to determine if 
there are additional organizations that warrant an individual listing in the survey. The 
second largest percentage of respondents within the federal civilian demographic are 
from CERDEC at 18.4 percent, followed by MITRE (14.3 percent), DISA (10.2 percent), 
NIST (10.2 percent), NSA (10.2 percent), DHS (8.2 percent), and RDECOM (6.1 
percent) (see Figure 15). As noted in chapter IV, MITRE is a leader in federal research on 
MDM, are federally funded, and not-for-profit. For these reasons, the researchers have 
included them in the federal civilian data source pool. 
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Figure 15.  Federal Civilian Response Rate 
The researchers are interested in gaining perspective on MDM from both a 
technical and acquisitions viewpoint. Question six shows that only 19 percent of the 
respondents described themselves as being acquisitions professionals. ITM professionals 
made up 23 percent of the respondents, followed by IA (21 percent) and IT professionals 
(17 percent) (see Figure 16). The researchers anticipate that a majority of the respondents 
who meet the survey criteria of being proficient in MDM will have a technical 
professional background. A response rate like this would validate the researcher’s 
assumption, with 61 percent of respondents coming from the technical professional 
backgrounds of IA, IT, and ITM. In addition, the percentage of technical background 
respondents may be even higher, depending on the responses received for the “other” 
group.   
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Figure 16.  Respondents’ Professional Backgrounds 
All of the uniformed service and federal civilian respondents to the survey are 
asked question eight: Do you believe that you have sufficient product 
experience/knowledge in order to contribute to the expansion of DoD’s knowledge in 
regards to Mobile Device Management?  Regardless of their responses, respondents 
answer questions 9 and 10.  
Question 9’s average response has a Likert value of 3.11, meaning that the 
average respondent of the survey feels that their organization provides some level of 
training on MDM. Cross-tabulating questions 2 and 9 allows for a breakdown of the level 
of MDM training that each Service branch provides. The data shows that the Air Force 
has the highest level of MDM training with a Likert average of 3.22; while the Army has 
the lowest at 2.75 (see Figure 17).  
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Figure 17.  Service Branch MDM Training Level 
Cross-tabulating questions five and nine allows for the same type of analysis for 
the federal civilian organizations. The results of this cross-tabulation show a much wider 
distribution across the different organizations, with the DHS having the highest average 
response level of 4.0 and the DISA the lowest at 2.2 (see Figure 18). An average response 
level of 4.0 means that the DHS provides a moderate level of MDM training. An average 
response level of 2.2 means that the DISA provides little MDM training.      
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Figure 18.  Federal Civilian Organizations’ MDM Training Level 
Question 10 should show what areas of training the respondents feel are required 
to become proficient in MDM. The data shows that the respondents feel there are a wide 
variety of training areas that make an individual proficient in MDM. Over 50 percent of 
the respondents agree that training in different types of material solutions (53 percent), 
information security (51 percent), and other areas (50 percent) are required to become 
proficient in MDM (see Figure 19).  
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Figure 19.  Training Required for Proficiency in MDM 
Cross-tabulating questions two and 10 shows what each Service branch believes 
is needed when training to become proficient in MDM. The data results would indicate 
that the most important training requirement for any Service branch is training on the 
types of material solutions to the Navy, with an 82 percent response rate. The least 
important requirement cited is training on BYOD to the Air Force, with a 10 percent 
response rate (see Figure 20). 
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Figure 20.  Training Required for Uniformed Service Proficiency in MDM 
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Cross-tabulating questions five and 10 shows the type of training that each federal 
civilian organization believes is required to become proficient in MDM. The data shows 
that there is a much wider variation of responses to question 10 between the federal 
civilians than between the uniformed service members. Just as in the uniformed services 
example, the most important training requirement cited by any federal civilian 
organization is training on the types of material solutions to MITRE, with an 86 percent 
response rate. The least important is training on iOS and Android operating systems to 
the DHS, with a zero percent response rate (see Figure 21). 
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Figure 21.  Training Required for Federal Civilian Proficiency in MDM 
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Cross-tabulating the demographic data from the survey with other section 
responses allows for the analysis of response rates and level of specific groups and 
organizations. It is also possible to identify individual responses by cross-tabulating the 
respondent ID with specific sections or questions. The researchers did not analyze the 
results on an individual respondent level, but this may be helpful to identify outlier 
respondents. 
2. Outliers and Excluded Responses 
Criteria can be set for what constitutes an outlier. For example, if an individual 
answers the same position on the survey for every question, this pattern of response could 
be considered a positive indicator of an outlier. The researcher can analyze the outlier 
responses and determine if they want to include or exclude the associated data.  
The disqualifying response to question eight is excluded from the data set. Actual 
responses to the survey will result in a number of respondents who feel that they do not 
have sufficient product experience or knowledge in MDM to contribute to the survey. 
Cross-tabulating disqualifying responses to question eight with question 10 should show 
what type of training is required to educate more individuals to make them proficient in 
MDM.  
3. Functional Requirements Results 
Part two of the survey, questions 11 through 26, captures information on the 
functional requirements of MDM. Part two contains three sections, which address MDM 
functions, the operating model, and technology maturity.  
a. MDM Attributes 
Questions 11 through 22 cover MDM attributes and use the same response 
profile. Each response corresponds to a Likert value between one and five, as follows: 
 Very unimportant—1, 
 Somewhat unimportant—2, 
 Neither important nor unimportant—3, 
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 Somewhat important—4, and 
 Very important—5.   
 
The Likert values allow for better analysis of the data results through 
quantification. The attributes with the highest Likert average are those the respondents 
feel are most important to MDM. The average of the response rate of each attribute 
within a functional requirement should show the importance of the requirement to MDM.  
The data indicates that the most important functional requirements to 
MDM are security management and inventory management, with an average response 
level of 3.01. The third most important functional requirement is malware control 
management at 2.93, followed by e-mail (2.90), administration and reporting tools (2.87), 
policy management (2.86), VPN management (2.85), and software distribution (2.76; see 
Figure 22). In the data, the average levels of importance are all within 0.25 points of each 
other. The researchers expect actual responses to the survey will result in a wider 
distribution. The results should show what functional requirements to focus on when 
determining a MDM solution.   
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Figure 22.  Functional Requirement Importance to MDM    
Breaking down the attributes by functional requirement shows what 
attributes are most important to MDM within the functional requirement. The data shows 
that within the e-mail functional requirement, integrated calendaring is the most 
important attribute to MDM at 3.11, while S/MIME capability is least important at 2.78 
(see Figure 23).  
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Figure 23.  E-mail Attribute Importance to MDM   
The data indicates the most important attribute across all of the functional 
requirements is a certificate of networthiness (CoN) at 3.31. The top 10 most important 
attributes to MDM are rounded out by the ability to do the following: enforce the DoD 
logon banner or custom text to device lock (3.22); remote device lock (3.21); disable 
automatic connection to Wi-Fi networks (3.20); IPSec/SSL end to end encryption (3.18); 
enforce URL and web content filtering (3.18); PKI based authentication (3.16); query 
support for device and network information (3.16); alert system for users and IT 
administrators when device policies are violated (3.15); and bluetooth profile 
whitelist/blacklist by peripheral type (3.14; see Figure 24). The most important attributes 
to MDM should show specifically what the respondents want out of an MDM solution. 
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Figure 24.  10 Most Important Attributes to MDM 
The least important attributes to MDM start with the ability to query for 
compliance and security information at 2.57, followed by these attributes: S/MIME 
capability (2.78); disable use of preinstalled browser (2.78); disable microphone(s) (2.8); 
enforce mobile communication expense policies, such as disabling cellular data or access 
to servers when roaming (2.8); disable access to public app repositories (2.82); device 
activation and deactivation (2.86); phishing protection (2.86); integration of hard and/or 
soft token user authentication (2.86); disable USB/serial port (2.88; see Figure 25). The 
attributes with the lowest response levels on the survey might be candidates for 
elimination from the requirements list.  
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Figure 25.  10 Least Important Attributes to MDM 
Questions 11 through 21 ask detailed information about the level of 
importance of the attributes within each functional requirement. The responses allow for 
individual attribute levels of importance to MDM. These individual levels factor into the 
aggregate level of importance for each functional requirement. Question 22 asks the 
respondents to rate the importance of each functional requirement without looking at the 
individual attributes. The researchers hope to see similar levels of importance for the 
functional requirements from the aggregate calculations of questions 11 through 21 and 
the individual results from question 22. The data does not reflect this. The level of 
importance assigned to each functional requirement varies noticeably (see Figure 26). 
Results like this could indicate that some of the individual attributes used for each 
functional requirement are inaccurate. This would force a reassessment of what attributes 
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make up each functional requirement. Another possibility could be that a number of 
individuals within the sample have different understandings of what comprises each 
functional requirement. The effects of this possibility would diminish through the 
standardization of terms and definitions and their assimilation into the population.   
 
Figure 26.  Functional Requirement Importance to MDM Q11–21 Versus Q22 
b. The Technology Readiness Level Results  
The data for question 26 would indicate that the survey respondents vary 
on where they feel MDM technological maturity stands. With a 15 percent response rate, 
most respondents believe that MDM technology is at a TRL of five. Each of the nine 
TRLs received between a seven and 15 percent response rate (see Figure 27). A higher 
response rate for the higher TRLs is desired. This would indicate that the respondents feel 
that MDM technology is mature. Having higher response rates at the lower end of the 
TRL scale would be cause to reassess whether MDM technology is mature enough to 
implement.  
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Figure 27.  MDM Technology Readiness Level   
C. USING THE COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS MODEL 
When using the cost effectiveness analysis model, organizational decision-makers 
must first determine the relative weights for each of the three evaluation criteria. These 
weights vary by situation and depend on how important each evaluation criteria is to the 
given situation. Decision-makers also assign weights to the stakeholder objectives of 
initial cost and maintenance cost. This allows for greater control over the weights 
assigned to the purchase price and maintenance costs when evaluating MDM solutions.  
The data collected from questions 11 through 21 allows for quantifications of the 
responses. This, in turn, allows the researchers to feed numbers into the MDM cost 
effectiveness analysis model. With the data integrated into the model, the next step is to 
evaluate alternative MDM solutions to determine the optimal choice. The weights of the 
stakeholder objectives that fall under the CEA model evaluation categories of capabilities 
and security are calculated with the data from the survey.  
The four functional requirements that make up the capabilities evaluation 
category are inventory management, e-mail, policy management, and software 
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distribution. These functional requirements are identified under the heading of 
stakeholder objectives on the cost effectiveness analysis model. To determine the 
weighted average of the stakeholder objectives under the capabilities category, the 
individual response levels from the survey are added together and each stakeholder 
objective is divided by that number. After performing the calculation, inventory 
management has a weighted average of 0.2611, e-mail has 0.2515, policy management 
0.2480, and software distribution 0.2394 (see Figure 28). The same calculations are 
performed for the stakeholder objectives under the security capability category and result 
in VPN management with a weighted average of 0.2444, malware control management 
with 0.2514, security management with 0.2581, and administrative and reporting tools 
with 0.2461 (see Figure 29).   
 
Figure 28.  Weights of Stakeholder Objectives in Capabilities Evaluation Category 
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Figure 29.  Weights of Stakeholder Objectives in Security Evaluation Category 
The attributes listed under each functional requirement in the survey represent the 
system requirements portion of the MDM cost effectiveness model. Each requirement 
receives a weight based on its relative importance to MDM under its particular 
stakeholder objective. A MDM solution either has a system requirement or not. For that 
reason, the system requirements can be looked at as a checklist when evaluating MDM 
solutions. 
The survey data results in a fairly even assignment of weight values within each 
stakeholder objective. An example of the even distribution is found within the policy 
management requirements in which the weight values range from 0.0711 to 0.0885 (see 
Figure 30). With live data, the dispersion of weights should be more pronounced.  
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Figure 30.  Relative Weight of Policy Management Requirements 
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D. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF MDM COST EFFECTIVENESS 
ANALYSIS MODEL 
Next, the researchers constructed a scenario to demonstrate the functionality of 
the MDM CEA model. The scenario is not modeled after an organization, and the 
information used is not drawn from any real-life source. The data generated from the 
survey is used as the basis for the model weights. In this example, the stakeholder 
objective scores are determined based on the general scenario information. In contrast, 
when utilizing the model with live information, every MDM solution alternative should 
be evaluated to determine if it fulfills each individual requirement. The resulting 
requirements score is then multiplied by its associated stakeholder objective weight to 
determine the stakeholder objective score.  
1. Scenario  
Organization A is looking at purchasing a MDM solution. Organization A has 
formed a special MDM evaluation committee to facilitate the search. The evaluation 
committee has narrowed the search to three candidates: MDM1, MDM2, and MDM3. 
The evaluation committee must perform a thorough evaluation on the candidates to 
determine the optimal MDM solution. 
Organization A deals with sensitive information on a regular basis and places high 
importance on the security of their network and operations. Organization A is looking for 
a MDM solution with a robust amount of capabilities, but they do not need an all-
encompassing solution. Organization A is very profitable, and are willing to pay top 
dollar for a MDM solution that meets its needs. 
MDM1 is a MDM solution designed to address a wide variety of MDM areas. If 
you can think of it, MDM1 can probably handle it. The initial and maintenance costs of 
MDM1 are very high.  
MDM2 is a MDM solution that takes a more targeted approach to MDM. Its focus 
is on the security aspects of MDM and has a few other capabilities. The initial and 
maintenance costs of MDM2 are moderate. 
  82 
MDM3 has a reputation for value. It offers a modest amount of security and 
capabilities features. The initial cost of MDM3 is low and the maintenance costs are 
low/moderate.      
2. Assigning Weights 
Based on its current situation, Organization A assigns weights of 0.5 to security, 
0.3 to capabilities, and 0.2 to TCO. Under the stakeholder objective of TCO, 
Organization A believes that maintenance cost is of equal importance as the initial cost. 
The organization assigns a weight of 0.5 to initial cost and 0.5 to maintenance cost (see 
Figure 31).  
 
Figure 31.  MDM CEA Model, Weights  
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3. Evaluation of Alternatives   
MDM1 receives a TCO, initial cost score of 0.25, and a TCO, maintenance cost 
score of 0.25. The resulting total TCO score is 0.25. MDM1’s total security requirements 
and total capabilities requirements each score 0.9. Each stakeholder objective score is 
multiplied by its weight value and added together. MDM1’s cost effectiveness score is 
0.77 (see Figure 32).  
 
Figure 32.  MDM CEA Model—MDM1 
MDM2 receives a TCO, initial cost score of 0.5, and a TCO, maintenance cost 
score of 0.5. The resulting total TCO score is 0.5. MDM2’s total security requirements 
score 1.0 and total capabilities score 0.25. MDM2’s cost effectiveness score is 0.675 (see 
Figure 33).  
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Figure 33.  MDM CEA Model—MDM2 
MDM3 receives a TCO, initial cost score of 1.0, and a TCO, maintenance cost 
score of 0.75. The resulting total TCO score is 0.875. MDM3’s total security 
requirements and total capabilities requirements each score 0.5. MDM3’s cost 
effectiveness score is 0.6125 (see Figure 34).  
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Figure 34.  MDM CEA Model – MDM3 
MDM1 earns the highest cost effectiveness score, 0.77 out of a possible 1.0. 
Therefore, MDM1 is the optimal MDM solution for Organization A.  
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The top suggestion for future research is the validation and execution of the 
survey instrument. Validation of the survey should include all of the participating 
agencies, while the execution must follow all of the applicable regulations governing 
research on the target population. This includes internal and external organizational 
oversight such as that provided by an institutional review board (IRB) and the Navy 
Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology Department (NPRST). A format for a 
research introduction e-mail is found in Appendix K.    
Future research should include the pre-testing of the survey, and could include the 
execution of focus groups. This would enable the further refinement, modification, and 
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evaluation of the survey questions while ensuring that the necessary calculations, such as 
reliability, validity, and Cronbach’s alpha, are captured. While this research is focused on 
the wider scope of the DoD, future research could be focused at a narrower scope, such as 
at the Service branch level. With slight modifications, this survey tool could be used for 
MDM research covering a wide variety of sizes and scopes. 
The use of automated software tools during the research was minimal. 
Incorporating decision tree analysis and concept mapping could benefit future researchers 
through the use of automated qualitative and quantitative research tools. Decision tree 
analysis could facilitate strategic decision-making through course of action development. 
Quantitative examples include, but are not limited to, JMP and SPSS. Concept mapping 
would provide understandable graphical relationships and facilitate coding development 
for qualitative analysis. Qualitative examples include, but are not limited to, ATLAS.ti, 
MAXqda, QDA Miner, SMART Ideas, and CMAP.  
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APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS OF SOURCES OF MOBILE 
THREATS 
(From GAO, 2012) 
 
Sources of Mobile Threats 
Threat Source Description 
Botnet operators Botnet operators use malware distributed to large numbers of 
mobile devices and other electronic systems to coordinate 
remotely controlled attacks on websites and to distribute 
phishing schemes, spam, and further malware attacks on 
individual mobile devices. 
Cyber criminals Cyber criminals generally attack mobile devices for monetary 
gain. They may use spam, phishing, and spyware/malware 
attacks to gain access to the information stored on a device, 
which they then use to commit identity theft, online fraud, and 
computer extortion. In addition, international criminal 
organizations pose a threat to corporations, government 
agencies, and other institutions by attacking mobile devices to 
conduct industrial espionage and large-scale monetary and 
intellectual property theft. 
Foreign 
governments 
Foreign intelligence services may attack mobile devices as part 
of their information-gathering and espionage activities. Foreign 
governments may develop information warfare doctrine, 
programs, and capabilities that could disrupt the supply chain, 
mobile communications, and economic infrastructure that 
support homeland security and national defense. 
Hackers Hackers may attack mobile devices to demonstrate their skill or 
gain prestige in the hacker community. While hacking once 
required a fair amount of skill or computer knowledge, hackers 
can now download attack scripts and protocols from the Internet 
and easily launch them against mobile devices.  
Terrorists Terrorists may seek to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit critical 
infrastructures such as mobile networks, to threaten national 
security, weaken the U.S. economy, or damage public morale 
and confidence. Terrorists may also use phishing schemes or 
spyware/malware to generate funds or gather sensitive 
information from mobile devices. 
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APPENDIX B. DEFINITIONS OF COMMON MOBILE ATTACKS 
(From GAO, 2012) 
 
Common Mobile Attacks 
Attacks Description 
Browser exploits These exploits are designed to take advantage of vulnerabilities 
in software used to access websites. Visiting certain web pages 
and/or clicking on certain hyperlinks can trigger browser 
exploits that install malware or perform other adverse actions on 
a mobile device. 
Data interception Data interception can occur when an attacker is eavesdropping 
on communications originating from or being sent to a mobile 
device. Electronic eavesdropping is possible through various 
techniques, such as (1) man-in-the-middle attacks, which occur 
when a mobile device connects to an unsecured Wi-Fi network 
and an attacker intercepts and alters the communication; and (2) 
Wi-Fi sniffing, which occurs when data are sent to or from a 
device over an unsecured (i.e., not encrypted) network 
connection, allowing an eavesdropper to “listen to” and record 
the information that is exchanged. 
Keystroke logging This is a type of malware that records keystrokes on mobile 
devices in order to capture sensitive information, such as credit 
card numbers. Generally keystroke loggers transmit the 
information they capture to a cyber-criminal’s website or e-mail 
address. 
Malware Malware is often disguised as a game, patch, utility, or other 
useful third-party software application. Malware can include 
spyware (software that is secretly installed to gather information 
on individuals or organizations without their knowledge), 
viruses (a program that can copy itself and infect the mobile 
system without permission or knowledge of the user), and 
Trojans (a type of malware that disguises itself as or hides itself 
within a legitimate file). Once installed, malware can initiate a 
wide range of attacks and spread itself onto other devices. The 
malicious application can perform a variety of functions, 
including accessing location information and other sensitive 
information, gaining read/write access to the user’s browsing 
history, as well as initiating telephone calls, activating the 
device’s microphone or camera to surreptitiously record 
information, and downloading other malicious applications. 
Repackaging—the process of modifying a legitimate application 
to insert malicious code—is one technique that an attacker can 




Location tracking allows the whereabouts of registered mobile 
devices to be known and monitored. While it can be done 
openly for legitimate purposes, it may also take place 
surreptitiously. Location data may be obtained through 
legitimate software applications as well as malware loaded on 
the user’s mobile device. 
Network exploits Network exploits take advantage of software flaws in the system 
that operates on local (e.g., Bluetooth, Wi-Fi) or cellular 
networks. Network exploits often can succeed without any user 
interaction, making them especially dangerous when used to 
automatically propagate malware. With special tools, attackers 
can find users on a Wi-Fi network, hijack the users’ credentials, 
and use those credentials to impersonate a user online. Another 
possible attack, known as bluesnarfing, enables attackers to gain 
access to contact data by exploiting a software flaw in a 
Bluetooth-enabled device. 
Phishing Phishing is a scam that frequently uses e-mail or pop-up 
messages to deceive people into disclosing sensitive 
information. Internet scammers use e-mail bait to “phish” for 
passwords and financial information from mobile users and 
other Internet users. 
Spamming Spam is unsolicited commercial e-mail advertising for products, 
services, and websites. Spam can also be used as a delivery 
mechanism for malicious software. Spam can appear in text 
messages as well as electronic mail. Besides the inconvenience 
of deleting spam, users may face charges for unwanted text 
messages. Spam can also be used for phishing attempts. 
Spoofing Attackers may create fraudulent websites to mimic or “spoof” 
legitimate sites and in some cases may use the fraudulent sites 
to distribute malware to mobile devices. E-mail spoofing occurs 
when the sender address and other parts of an e-mail header are 
altered to appear as though the e-mail originated from a 
different source. Spoofing hides the origin of an e-mail 
message. Spoofed e-mails may contain malware. 
Theft/Loss Because of their small size and use outside the office, mobile 
devices can be easier to misplace or steal than a laptop or 
notebook computer. If mobile devices are lost or stolen, it may 
be relatively easy to gain access to the information they store. 
Zero-day exploit A zero-day exploit takes advantage of a security vulnerability 
before an update for the vulnerability is available. By writing an 
exploit for an unknown vulnerability, the attacker creates a 
potential threat because mobile devices generally will not have 
software patches to prevent the exploit from succeeding. 
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APPENDIX C. DEFINITIONS OF KEY SECURITY CONTROLS 
(From GAO, 2012) 
 
Key Security Controls to Combat Common Mobile Threats and Vulnerabilities 
Security Control Description 
Enable user 
authentication 
Devices can be configured to require passwords or PINs to gain 
access. In addition, the password field can be masked to prevent 
it from being observed, and the devices can activate idle-time 





Two-factor authentication can be used when conducting 
sensitive transactions on mobile devices. Two-factor 
authentication provides a higher level of security than 
traditional passwords. Two-factor refers to an authentication 
system in which users are required to authenticate using at least 
two different “factors”—something you know, something you 
have, or something you are—before being granted access. 
Mobile devices themselves can be used as a second factor in 
some two-factor authentication schemes used for remote access. 
The mobile device can generate pass codes, or the codes can be 
sent via a text message to the phone. Two-factor authentication 
may be important when sensitive transactions occur, such as for 





Procedures can be implemented for assessing the digital 
signatures of downloaded applications to ensure that they have 
not been tampered with. 
Install antimalware 
capability 
Antimalware protection can be installed to protect against 
malicious applications, viruses, spyware, infected secure digital 
cards, and malware-based attacks. In addition, such capabilities 
can protect against unwanted (spam) voice messages, text 
messages, and e-mail attachments. 
Install a firewall A personal firewall can protect against unauthorized 
connections by intercepting both incoming and outgoing 
connection attempts and blocking or permitting them based on a 
list of rules. 
Receive prompt 
security updates 
Software updates can be automatically transferred from the 
manufacturer or carrier directly to a mobile device. Procedures 
can be implemented to ensure these updates are transmitted 
promptly. 
Remotely disable 
lost or stolen devices 
Remote disabling is a feature for lost or stolen devices that 
either locks the device or completely erases its contents 
remotely. Locked devices can be unlocked subsequently by the 
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user if they are recovered. 
Enable encryption 
for data stored on 
device or memory 
card 
File encryption protects sensitive data stored on mobile devices 
and memory cards. Devices can have built-in encryption 
capabilities or use commercially available encryption tools. 
Enable whitelisting Whitelisting is a software control that permits only known safe 
applications to execute commands. 
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APPENDIX D. DEFINITIONS OF ADDITIONAL SECURITY 
CONTROLS 
(From GAO, 2012) 
 
Additional Security Controls to Combat Common Mobile Threats and 
Vulnerabilities 





Centralized security management can ensure an organization’s 
mobile devices are compliant with its security policies. 
Centralized security management includes (1) configuration 
control, such as installing remote disabling on all devices; and 
(2) management practices, such as setting policy for individual 
users or a class of users on specific devices. 
Use mobile device 
integrity validation 
software 
Software tools can be used to scan devices for key 
compromising events (e.g., an unexpected change in the file 
structure) and then report the results of the scans, including a 
risk rating and recommended mitigation. 
Implement a virtual 
private network 
(VPN) 
A VPN can provide a secure communications channel for 
sensitive data transferred across multiple, public networks 
during remote access. VPNs are useful for wireless technologies 
because they provide a way to secure wireless local area 
networks, such as those at public Wi-Fi spots, in homes, or 
other locations. 
Use public key 
infrastructure (PKI) 
support 






Organizations can require that devices meet government 
specifications before they are deployed. For example, NIST 
recommends that mobile devices used in government 
enterprises adhere to a minimum set of security requirements 
for cryptographic modules that include both hardware and 
software components. The Defense Information Systems 
Agency has certified a secure Android-based mobile system for 
use by DoD agencies. The system allows DoD personnel to 
sign, encrypt and decrypt e-mail, and securely access data from 
a smartphone or tablet computer. 
Install an enterprise 
firewall 
An enterprise firewall can be configured to isolate all 
unapproved traffic to and from wireless devices. 
Monitor incoming 
traffic 
Enterprise information technology network operators can use 
intrusion prevention software to examine traffic entering the 
network from mobile devices. 
Monitor and control Devices can be monitored and controlled for messaging, data 
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devices leakage, inappropriate use, and to prevent applications from 
being installed. 
Enable, obtain, and 
analyze device log 
files for compliance 
Log files can be reviewed to detect suspicious activity and 
ensure compliance. 
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APPENDIX E. DEFINITIONS OF KEY SECURITY PRACTICES 
(From GAO, 2012) 
 
Key Security Practices to Combat Common Mobile Threats and Vulnerabilities 
Security Practice Description 





When in discoverable mode, Bluetooth-enabled devices are 
“visible” to other nearby devices, which may alert an attacker 
to target them. When Bluetooth is turned off or in 
nondiscoverable mode, the Bluetooth-enabled devices are 
invisible to other unauthenticated devices. 




Attackers may patrol public Wi-Fi networks for unsecured 
devices or even create malicious Wi-Fi spots designed to attack 
mobile phones. Public Wi-Fi spots represent an easy channel 
for hackers to exploit. Users can limit their use of public Wi-Fi 
networks by not conducting sensitive transactions when 
connected to them or if connecting to them, using secure, 
encrypted connections. This can help reduce the risk of 
attackers obtaining sensitive information such as passwords, 





Once installed, applications may be able to access user content 
and device programming interfaces, and they may also contain 
vulnerabilities. Users can reduce risk by limiting unnecessary 
applications. 
Configure web 
accounts to use 
secure connections 
Accounts for many websites can be configured to use secure, 
encrypted connections. Enabling this feature limits 
eavesdropping on web sessions. 
Do not follow links 
sent in suspicious e- 
mail or text 
messages 
Users should not follow links in suspicious e-mail or text 
messages, because such links may lead to malicious websites. 
Limit clicking on 
suspicious 
advertisements 
within an application 
Suspicious advertisements may include links to malicious 
websites, prompting the users to download malware, or violate 
their privacy. Users can limit this risk by not clicking on 
suspicious advertisements within applications. 
Limit exposure of 
mobile phone 
numbers 
By not posting mobile phone numbers to public websites, users 
may be able to limit the extent to which attackers can obtain 
known mobile numbers to attack. 
Limit storage of 
sensitive information 
on mobile devices 




Users can take steps to safeguard their mobile devices, such as 
by keeping their devices secured in a bag to reduce the risk that 
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their mobile devices will be lost or stolen. 
Delete all 
information stored in 
a device prior to 
discarding it 
By using software tools that thoroughly delete (or “wipe”) 
information stored in a device before discarding it, users can 
protect their information from unauthorized access. 
Avoid modifying 
mobile devices 
Modifying or “jailbreaking” mobile devices can expose them to 
security vulnerabilities or can prevent them from receiving 
security updates. 
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APPENDIX F. DEFINITIONS OF ADDITIONAL SECURITY 
PRACTICES 
(From GAO, 2012) 
 
Additional Security Practices to Combat Common Mobile Threats and 
Vulnerabilities 
Security Practice Description 
Establish a mobile 
device security 
policy 
Security policies define the rules, principles, and practices that 
determine how an organization treats mobile devices, whether 
they are issued by the organization or owned by individuals. 
Policies should cover areas such as roles and responsibilities, 
infrastructure security, device security, and security 
assessments. By establishing policies that address these areas, 
agencies can create a framework for applying practices, tools, 




Training employees in an organization’s mobile security 
policies can help to ensure that mobile devices are configured, 
operated, and used in a secure and appropriate manner. 
Establish a 
deployment plan 
Following a well-designed deployment plan helps to ensure that 
security objectives are met. 
Perform risk 
assessments 
Risk analysis identifies vulnerabilities and threats, enumerates 
potential attacks, assesses their likelihood of success, and 






Configuration management ensures that mobile devices are 
protected against the introduction of improper modifications 
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APPENDIX G. POSITION CATEGORY DESCRIPTIONS 
(From DAU, 2013) 
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APPENDIX H. TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVELS 
(From DRD DDR&E , 2009) 
The following matrix lists the various technology readiness levels and descriptions from a 
systems approach for both hardware and software. DoD Components may provide 
additional clarifications for software. Supplemental definitions follow the table. 
 
Technology Readiness Level Description 
1. Basic principles observed and reported Lowest level of technology readiness. 
Scientific research begins to be translated 
into applied research and development. 
Examples might include paper studies of a 
technology’s basic properties. 
2. Technology concept and/or application 
formulated 
Invention begins. Once basic principles 
are observed, practical applications can be 
invented. Applications are speculative and 
there may be no proof or detailed analysis 
to support the assumptions. Examples are 
limited to analytic studies. 
3. Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of 
concept 
Active research and development is 
initiated. This includes analytical studies 
and laboratory studies to physically 
validate analytical predictions of separate 
elements of the technology. Examples 
include components that are not yet 
integrated or representative. 
4. Component and/or breadboard 
validation in laboratory environment 
Basic technological components are 
integrated to establish that they will work 
together. This is relatively “low fidelity” 
compared to the eventual system. 
Examples include integration of ad hoc 
hardware in the laboratory. 
5. Component and/or breadboard 
validation in relevant environment 
Fidelity of breadboard technology 
increases significantly. The basic 
technological components are integrated 
with reasonably realistic supporting 
elements so it can be tested in a simulated 
environment. Examples include “high 
fidelity” laboratory integration of 
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components. 
6. System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment 
Representative model or prototype 
system, which is well beyond that of TRL 
5, is tested in a relevant environment. 
Represents a major step up in a 
technology’s demonstrated readiness. 
Examples include testing a prototype in a 
high-fidelity laboratory environment or in 
a simulated operational environment. 
7. System prototype demonstration in an 
operational environment 
Prototype near, or at, planned operational 
system. Represents a major step up from 
TRL 6, requiring demonstration of an 
actual system prototype in an operational 
environment such as an aircraft, vehicle, 
or space. Examples include testing the 
prototype in a test bed aircraft. 
8. Actual system completed and qualified 
through test and demonstration 
Technology has been proven to work in its 
final form and under expected conditions. 
In almost all cases, this TRL represents 
the end of true system development. 
Examples include developmental test and 
evaluation of the system in its intended 
weapon system to determine if it meets 
design specifications. 
9. Actual system proven through 
successful mission operations 
Actual application of the technology in its 
final form and under mission conditions, 
such as those encountered in operational 
test and evaluation. Examples include 





BREADBOARD: Integrated components that provide a representation of a 
system/subsystem and which can be used to determine concept feasibility and to develop 
technical data. Typically configured for laboratory use to demonstrate the technical 
principles of immediate interest. May resemble final system/subsystem in function only. 
 
“HIGH FIDELITY”: Addresses form, fit and function. High-fidelity laboratory 
environment would involve testing with equipment that can simulate and validate all 
system specifications within a laboratory setting. 
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“LOW FIDELITY”: A representative of the component or system that has limited 
ability to provide anything but first order information about the end product. Low-fidelity 
assessments are used to provide trend analysis. 
 
MODEL: A functional form of a system, generally reduced in scale, near or at 
operational specification. Models will be sufficiently hardened to allow demonstration of 
the technical and operational capabilities required of the final system. 
 
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: Environment that addresses all of the operational 
requirements and specifications required of the final system to include 
platform/packaging. 
 
PROTOTYPE: A physical or virtual model used to evaluate the technical or 
manufacturing feasibility or military utility of a particular technology or process, concept, 
end item or system. 
 
RELEVANT ENVIRONMENT: Testing environment that simulates the key aspects of 
the operational environment. 
 
SIMULATED OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL: Either 1) a real environment 
that can simulate all of the operational requirements and specifications required of the 
final system, or 2) a simulated environment that allows for testing of a virtual prototype; 
used in either case to determine whether a developmental system meets the operational 
requirements and specifications of the final system. 
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APPENDIX I. USER SURVEY 
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APPENDIX K. RESPONDENT NOTIFICATION  
To: [e-mail] 
From: [insert e-mail here] 
  
Subject: [insert Institutional / Organizational name here] Mobile Device Management Survey 
Body: Dear [insert Title and Name here], 
 
My name is [insert Name here]. I am assigned to the [insert Institutional / Organizational name 
here] in [insert City, State] conducting research in support of a master’s level thesis. The 
Principal Investigator is [insert Name, position, and contact information here]. The Institutional 
Review Board Chair is [insert Name and contact information here]. 
 
I am contacting Subject Matter Experts in the fields of Information Systems, Information 
Assurance, and Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisitions in order to expand the body of 
knowledge for Mobile Device Management. I feel that your understanding and experience would 
benefit the DoD community at large and contribute greatly to my research. 
 
The title of my thesis is [insert ThesisName here]. I am gathering data in order to analyze the 
current use and management of mobile devices on the DoD network, the risk factors present, 
integration issues encountered, and future plans for mobile device management. I feel my end 
product will capture the concerns of IT professionals and provide acquisitions professionals with 
a better understanding of factors for analysis when acquiring mobile device management 
solutions.  
 
I would appreciate your support in my research through participation in a web survey. 
 
Here is a link to the survey: 
[insert web link here] 
 




Please note: If you do not wish to receive further e-mails from me, please click the link below, 
and you will be automatically removed from my mailing list. 
[insert web link here] 
 




[insert Name here] 
 
[insert signature block here] 
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